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Abstract 
The April 25th, 2015 earthquake and its aftershocks in Nepal significantly shaped 
many aspects of life in impacted communities. Three years later, many individuals are 
still working to rebuild their homes; at the same time, Nepal has a high likelihood of 
future earthquakes. In this context, disaster risk management (DRM) – including 
preparation, response, and reconstruction– remains a crucial component of Nepali 
society. This thesis examines the work of the National Society for Earthquake 
Technology (NSET), a Nepali non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 1993 
and a leading organization in DRM in Nepal. Through an analysis of the organization 
itself, and its relationship with the Government of Nepal (at both the national and local 
level), other NGOs, development agencies, and local communities, I argue that NSET is 
able to reach across different perceptions of risk to implement effective DRM 
programming due to its diverse programming, its unique social mobilizer position, and 
the relationships it has established with the aforementioned entities. However, it faces 
limitations in its ability to affect lasting change within some communities in Nepal due to 
its focus on scientifically conceived methods of risk at the expense of other culturally 
shaped perceptions. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
By the time that I arrived in Nepal, approaching two years after the 2015 
earthquake, all that remained of my host family’s old house was the pile of bricks stacked 
neatly in the corner of the garden. They were lucky enough to have already moved into 
the small concrete house that survived without damage in the quakes and their losses 
were minimized. No sign remained of the tents that had popped up in the immediate 
aftermath to house their neighbors, structures that were crowded with people and sleeping 
areas but still had a small T.V. in the corner – once power was restored, one neighbor ran 
electricity into the space. However, many in the surrounding community were not as 
fortunate as my host family and, two years later, the sounds of construction still filled the 
neighborhood. Over the course of my five months there, I noted the daily progress as 
families sought to finish the construction before the monsoon rains – laying foundations, 
carrying bricks from old structures, pouring concrete, or stuccoing walls. 
The progress could be seen beyond my immediate neighbors as well. Every day, 
as I walked the hour home from school along a road lined with fields, houses, and shops, 
I would notice little changes in the buildings along the way. Houses that were previously 
dark concrete would be newly painted… a subdued yellow with a pop of color or a bright 
blue that looked like the sky on an elusively clear day in the Kathmandu valley. Work on 
another house would be more subtle, mostly finishing touches on the inside until one day 
new black and white tiles would frame the outside windows and a shop would reopen in 
the bottom floor. Still other buildings would seemingly appear out of nowhere; a glance 
to the side at an opportune moment would result in a double take as my view of the 
distant hills was broken by a three-story building that had been constructed over the last 
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few weeks. Disparities within the community emerged clearly in the reconstruction 
process – my didi (older sister) pointed to an especially large and elaborate house, nearly 
twice the size of our own, surrounded by a tall, black wrought iron fence, and told me 
how one man lived there alone, but his four sons lived in the United States and had sent 
back funds to build it. The opulence of his house was emphasized by the tiny temporary 
shelter, just two houses away, that still housed a family of five next door.  
 In many ways, this story represents a broader picture of Nepal, one influenced 
internally and externally by the impacts of earthquakes within communities. Indeed, 
when many people think about Nepal, the first thing that comes to mind is the 7.8 
magnitude earthquake that hit on April 25th, 2015 – known as the Gorkha earthquake, this 
initial quake was devastating, with nearly 9,000 people killed, over 500,000 buildings 
destroyed, and 2.8 million people requiring humanitarian assistance (Anderson and 
Baruah 2016; USGS 2015). It was the most devastating earthquake in the country since 
the “Great Earthquake” of 1934. Even so, many people are quick to recognize that it was 
a blessing that the earthquake hit on a Saturday morning – if it had hit when more people 
were sleeping or in schools and office buildings, the death toll would have been 
significantly higher (Humanosphere; Revkin 2015). Subsequent aftershocks, especially 
that of May 12th, 2015, continued to rock the country in the weeks that followed.  
It is easy to see how these earthquakes have impacted nearly every aspect of life 
in Nepal; over the course of my five months living there, the 2015 earthquakes came up 
in conversations about changing politics, photographers’ work, the necessity of building 
new health posts, mother languages, practicing religion, and more. However, while the 
earthquakes of 1934 and 2015 stand out, Nepal is the 11th most at risk country for 
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earthquakes in the world, due largely to the 92 active faults that have been recorded 
within its borders. Significant quakes hit Nepal nearly every year1 (Kafle 2017:16; NSET, 
“Hazards”). In an article published in January 2015 for the anniversary of the 1934 
earthquake, the author writes that Kathmandu is listed as number one in the top ten most 
at-risk cities in the world and expresses concern over the lack of institutional 
preparedness in the country (Nepali Times 2015). Nepal remains at risk for more 
earthquakes of equal or greater size; in addition to Nepal's general high seismicity level, 
western Nepal is overdue for a huge earthquake and the recent ones in eastern Nepal did 
not relieve the tension on major fault lines. 
Nepal’s high likelihood for disasters comes at the intersection of plate tectonics, 
broader geography, and human-caused factors. Disasters in Nepal go beyond earthquake 
and also include floods, landslides, and floods, among others; over 28,000 people in 
Nepal died from such disasters between 1971 and 2012 (Adhikari et al 2016:1). Shifting 
weather patterns, which can be attributed to human-caused climate change, made for an 
especially destructive monsoon season in 2017 with 41 million people affected in 
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal by the extreme flooding (Gettleman 2017). Climate change 
has also led to higher melting rates in the Himalayas, leading to increased risk for 
catastrophic glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF events), like the Dig Tsho outburst in 
1985 near Khumbu Himal (for more information, see ICIMOD 2011). GLOFs and 
landslides can also be triggered by earthquakes, both small and large, and exacerbated by 
development projects on unstable mountain slopes (MoHA and DPNet-Nepal 2013:9). 
Underlying all of this is the plate tectonics that shaped the Himalayas, pushing the rock 
                                                
1 Between 1971 and 2007, 22 earthquakes of 4.5-6.5 magnitude on the Richter scale were recorded in Nepal 
(NSET website, Hazards in Nepal, “Earthquakes”) 
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higher and higher above sea level as the Indian plate pressed inland; these processes 
continue to place tension on the fault lines underlying the country.  
In this environment, with ongoing threats of disaster and the events that followed 
the 2015 earthquakes, many people have been asking, what can be done to minimize the 
impacts of another earthquake of this magnitude? What was being done before the 2015 
earthquakes and how did that play out? What is the field of disaster risk management 
(DRM) like in Nepal? These questions shaped my initial research exploration. 
This thesis builds on literature following regional disasters, including the 2001 
Gujarat earthquake in India, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, and the 2005 
Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan. Building on these discussions, especially regarding 
regional disasters that may share similar societal backgrounds, allows me to 
conceptualize how a disaster of this magnitude and nature creates ruptures in society, 
develop a comparison of governmental and institutional responses, and fill in pieces of 
the literature that have not yet been published on the 2015 earthquakes. For further 
reading, see Özerdem and Jacoby (2006), Karan and Subbiah (2011), Gamburd (2013), 
and Simpson (2013). I also situate my own scholarship within the existing literature on 
the Gorkha earthquake of 2015, including ongoing research into aid, reconstruction, and 
resilience. 
Disaster risk management (DRM) in Nepal is a developing field and one that has 
been expanding exponentially over the last few decades. The field of DRM includes all 
aspects of work with disasters, including preparation before an event, search and rescue 
during, and reconstruction and rebuilding afterwards, and is visualized as a circular 
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process with reconstruction leading to and including preparation for future disasters2. 
While most of the focus on DRM in Nepal began in the 1990s or later, there are now 
dozens of NGOs and INGOs working to support and supplement government initiatives. 
These groups include, but are not limited to, National Society for Earthquake 
Technology-Nepal (NSET), Nepal Centre for Disaster Management (NCDM), Nepal 
Geological Society (NGS), Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
Additionally, the government recognizes Earthquake Safety Day each year on the 
anniversary of the 1934 earthquake, typically marking it with commemoration events, 
presentations, and safety demonstrations3. Many of these organizations began reflecting 
on lessons learned in the 2015 earthquakes and implement new programs, representing a 
unique moment for DRM in Nepal. In an interview with República, a Nepali newspaper, 
Khadga Sen Oli, an expert from NSET, describes how the discourse surrounding 
preparation changed after the earthquake, shifting from “why we should prepare for an 
earthquake” to “how can earthquake risk be minimized” (Republica 2018, emphasis 
added). 
Even with Nepal's high risk for numerous kinds of disasters, including 
earthquakes, floods, and landslides, NSET was the first major group to work on disaster 
risk management in the country. Shocked into action by the 1988 Udaypur earthquake 
                                                
2 DRM should be distinguished from Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), another commonly utilized 
terminology in literature and programming. DRR is one component of the DRM process and a key 
component of preparation prior to a disaster that seeks to minimize the events’ occurrence or associated 
impacts. 
3 The events on January 16th, 2018 (Magh 2nd on the Nepali calendar) marked the 20th commemoration 
(NSET, “Nepal Marking 20th Earthquake Safety Day”; Republica 2018). 
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and its resulting impacts in Nepal4, Amod Dixit left his position with the Department of 
Mines and Geology, serving first as a consultant on a revamped national building code 
that considered seismic engineering and then founding the National Society for 
Earthquake Technology. NSET is considered to be one of the leading organizations in 
DRM in Nepal and now works both domestically and internationally. For this thesis, my 
guiding research questions are: In what ways does NSET support and/or collaborate with 
government, community, and other institutions to implement DRM programming in 
Nepal and the region? How does it navigate differing conceptions of risk – within the 
institution, at the community and governmental level, and in conversation with funding 
agencies and other NGOs? How do these components influence its effectiveness (and 
what does effectiveness look like?) in programming? 
While NSET’s founding was focused on engineering and science-focused 
research, it has worked to develop a model that allows it to reach and work with 
individuals across Nepal and the greater South Asia region through established 
relationships with other components of the DRM process. I argue that NSET is able to 
reach across different perceptions of risk to implement effective DRM programming due 
to its diverse programming, its unique social mobilizer position, and its relationships with 
the government (at all levels in Nepal and regional countries), other NGOs, development 
agencies like USAID, and local communities. However, while NSET remains the leading 
organization working on DRM in Nepal, it faces limitations in its ability to affect lasting 
change within some communities in Nepal due to its focus on scientifically conceived 
methods of risk at the expense of other culturally shaped perceptions. 
                                                
4 This 6.7 earthquake hit central and eastern Nepal on Aug 21, 1988, killing 722 people, injuring 12,244 
more, and destroying around 60,000 houses (McNicoll 1989:18). It also destroyed 1,202 schools and 1,159 
public buildings, and disrupted roads, water sources, and development projects (Chaulagain et al 2018:10). 
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Methodology 
This thesis is based on five months living in Nepal with language and cultural 
study through the Pitzer in Nepal program, including six weeks of directed research. 
Following about four months of intensive language study, living with a host family, and 
learning about the political, historical, cultural, and social context of Nepal, I turned to 
my research project. With an academic background that included coursework and an 
internship focused on human rights and humanitarianism, I arrived in Nepal anticipating 
conducting research on refugees or international humanitarian aid following the 2015 
earthquakes. However, as I learned about the wealth of domestic institutions that had 
been working on earthquake preparedness for over two decades, I decided to focus on 
how organizations, community groups, and individuals were rebuilding from 2015, while 
grappling with the threat of another earthquake in the future. Specifically, I looked at 
community and individual experiences in the 2015 Nepal earthquakes, their level of 
knowledge about earthquake science and DRM, and what actions they’re currently 
taking. I also worked with several NGOs, government departments, INGOs, and 
community groups to look at programs implemented before, during, and after the last 
earthquake. Overall, my research focused on NSET and other DRM institutions 
themselves, as well as the people who worked with them.  
To provide an overview of the field of Disaster Risk Management in Nepal, 
NSET as an organization, and NSET’s initiatives, I talked with experts in Kathmandu 
from a variety of organizations. These included interviews with leaders from the National 
Red Cross Society, the National Centre for Disaster Management, and the Disaster 
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Preparedness Network (DPNet-Nepal). Over the course of my research, I met with 
individuals from the government, in the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National 
Reconstruction Campaign. I also interviewed officials from USAID’s Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Reconstruction, & Resilience (DR4) Office and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, which provided an international perspective. At NSET, I spoke 
with a number of individuals, including the founder, Amod Dixit, and leaders of Baliyo 
Ghar and the Program for Enhanced Emergency Response (PEER) at the main office, as 
well as two technical engineers and one social mobilizer working for NSET in Singati. 
To connect directly with NSET’s work I also interviewed individuals on two disaster 
management committees (DMCs) in Chhetrapati and Panga, two neighborhoods in the 
Kathmandu Valley, and attended a retrofitting presentation for the Chhetrapati Free 
Clinic, which is associated with the former DMC. My interviews were conducted in 
either English or Nepali, or often a combination of the two, depending on the preference 
of the individuals I was interviewing. Most often, the language of choice was Nepali with 
English phrases to clarify more complex ideas. 
To expand on my research on NSET’s program implementation, especially the 
Baliyo Ghar program for rebuilding after the 2015 earthquakes, I conducted research for 
five days in Baruwa5, a Village Development Committee (VDC) in Dolakha, one of the 
districts most heavily damaged in the 2015 earthquakes and the epicenter for the May 
12th aftershock. The location was identified with the assistance of staff at the main NSET 
office, and NSET’s support was critical for the execution of my project within my limited 
time frame – in addition to help with my homestay, the Baruwa technical engineer 
provided me with an initial tour of the town and introduced me to many of the residents. 
                                                
5 Baruwa is a pseudonym selected to provide anonymity to my informants. 
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Additionally, I was able to conduct participant observation while visiting construction 
sites with him and complete an interview with the full Baruwa NSET team: the technical 
engineer, social mobilizer, and lead mason. I also conducted both formal and informal 
interviews with a small group of teachers at the secondary school, a health post worker, 
people building houses at multiple sites, the newly elected ward chairperson, and other 
villagers. When included in my paper, these interviews will be referred to by the position 
of the individuals (for example “Ward Chairperson – Interview”) to further preserve their 
anonymity. Within the village setting I found that people were much more willing to 
engage with me in the context of informal interviews or conversations rather than in a 
formal interview following a list of pre-prepared questions. However, all of these 
interviews or conversations were prefaced with an explanation of my project and how I 
would share the information. While in Baruwa, all interviews and conversations were 
conducted in Nepali. 
I have also utilized various materials published by NSET, USAID, and other 
DRM organizations, including informational pamphlets, progress reports, blog posts, and 
awareness videos. Many of these informational pamphlets and awareness videos were 
collected while conducting research in Nepal, while others are publically available 
online. Key NSET documents, from the main office in Kathmandu and the regional office 
in Singati, include brochures outlining its programs (typically in English), basic 
earthquake preparedness manuals and possible scenarios (in English and Nepali), and 
technical handbooks for earthquake resilient construction (typically in Nepali). I was also 
able to view the approximately two-hour long orientation video shown at the beginning 
of the Baliyo Ghar program. Lastly, the Singati NSET office provided me with the most 
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recent progress reports, available in English, from all six of the VDCs in which they 
oversee work, including Baruwa. 
Throughout all of my interviews and research, language – especially my 
command of Nepali – provided an underlying factor shaping my research. My studies 
with Pitzer in Nepal gave me a basic command of Nepali and Devanagari. Before 
conducting my research, I spent over 200 classroom hours learning Nepali, lived with a 
host family where we only spoke in Nepali, and frequently communicated with a variety 
of individuals unassociated with the program in the same language. I also worked with 
one of my language teachers to identify vocabulary specific to disaster risk management, 
construction, and earthquakes. From this preparation, I was able to conduct my 
interviews primarily in Nepali, without the assistance of an interpreter. Many of these 
interviews were reviewed with my language instructor, with permission from informants, 
to clarify certain terminology or phrases.  
My position as a white American woman also played a significant role in my 
research in Nepal. As a young woman, I had to navigate dynamics with leaders at various 
NGOs and governmental agencies in a still very male-dominated society where all but 
two of my informants in the DRM field were men. However, my college education, 
personal connection to earthquake risk having grown up in the Pacific Northwest, and my 
strong foundational understanding of the earthquakes, history of Nepal, and Nepali 
culture through the Pitzer in Nepal program all served to facilitate a strong connection. 
Additionally, being a young woman in a village setting like that of Baruwa gave me a 
point of connection with other women in the village, who welcomed me into their work 
circles and took me under their wing.  
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Being American, especially a white American with the financial resources to 
travel to and study in Nepal, also carried important implications that are especially 
prominent in the fields of disaster risk management and humanitarian assistance related 
to the earthquakes of 2015. To that end, I emphasized my position as an undergraduate 
researcher in my introductions to provide an upfront representation of my role in the 
community. However, this not always successfully communicated. In one instance, in 
Baruwa, three individuals hanging out at a local store told me to go interview their 
neighbors up the road who were rebuilding “a strong house” to code. Despite reiterations 
throughout that conversation and in the subsequent interviews, when I returned, they 
asked me if the house had been good enough to receive additional funding support, either 
from the Nepali government or an imagined American organization. Comments like these 
were always handled with direct responses and explanations of my position as a 
researcher, independent from the Nepali government, humanitarian organizations, and 
funding sources. While more nuanced and subtle, there were likely undertones of this in 
interviews with other individuals. Individuals at a number of different organizations, 
including the government, NSET, and Nepal Red Cross Society, all of which receive 
significant funding from USAID and international funding sources, likely focused on 
success stories, whether with conscious attention to the impacts of publications about 
their work or subconscious habits related to funding. 
 
Roadmap 
 In this thesis, I begin with a literature review of existing scholarship on risk, risk 
perception, and resilience theory, before turning to four ethnographic chapters. The first 
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of these – Chapter 3 – will provide an overview of the National Society for Earthquake 
Technology, placing it within the context of Nepal’s political history. From there, 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will analyze NSET's relationships with the government, NGOs and 
other organizations, and the community, respectively.  
In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of risk and risk perception theory, as well as 
its intersections with resilience theory and risk communication. I will first discuss how 
the terms “risk” and “disaster” are utilized in the fields of anthropology and disaster risk 
management, including the definitions I will utilize in this paper. Within my broader 
discussion of risk theory, I draw primarily on the work of Mary Douglas and Anthony 
Oliver-Smith to develop an analysis of two different forms of risk perception present in 
Nepal – the scientific, “objective” perception, and the indigenous, “subjective” 
perception. I then incorporate the applications of risk theory to natural disasters, looking 
specifically at the intersections with risk communication and theories of resilience. 
Chapter 3 provides the setting and institutional background for NSET within 
Nepal. I address the recent political history of Nepal, emphasizing the factors that shape 
NSET's work in the country and those that shape disaster response. This includes a brief 
overview of major government developments since 1950, a brief history of NGOs in 
Nepal, and the 2017 local elections, the first in twenty years. From there, I walk through 
the institutional background of NSET, including its founding as the first organization 
working on DRM in Nepal. I provide context for what motivated individuals to focus on 
DRM work and the background of these individuals, in order to situate its work in 
relation to other related fields in Nepal, including engineering. Many of the people 
working with NSET have engineering or geology backgrounds but felt compelled to join 
  
Shriner 20 
the organization to work on DRM after seeing the devastation caused by other regional 
disasters and realizing that very few people were doing this work. I close the chapter with 
an overview of NSET's work throughout the years, including the major programs that I 
will address in more detail later in the thesis – the Building Code Implementation 
Program for Municipalities in Nepal (BCIPN), the Program for Enhancement of 
Emergency Response (PEER), and Baliyo Ghar (reconstruction).  
Chapter 4 looks at NSET's relationship with the government and is the first of 
three chapters positioning NSET in relation to other components of the disaster risk 
management field in Nepal. I begin by situating the Government of Nepal's response 
within the broader picture of the 2015 earthquakes and recognizing the government's 
unique and critical role in disaster risk management. I examine the relationship of 
collaboration and tension that exists between NSET and the Government of Nepal, 
highlighting the National Building Code – a key component of NSET's mission, which 
relies on the expertise of NSET and the implementation of the government. I also develop 
NSET's critique of the government, significantly a critique of the government's response 
to the 2015 earthquakes and NSET's perceptions of the government’s motivation and 
effectiveness working on DRM. Utilizing anthropologist S. Ravi Rajan's concept of 
missing expertise, and specifically contingent expertise – an administration's 
preparedness to respond to a major disaster event – I illustrate the potential for continued 
collaboration between NSET and the government to enhance the Government of Nepal's 
capacity to respond to future earthquakes.  
In Chapter 5, I tackle NSET's position within the plethora of NGOs and foreign 
governmental organizations that exist and work in Nepal. Following an overview of the 
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history of NGOs in Nepal and their significant role in shaping Nepal's development, I 
identify three categories of organizations that are key in discussions of disaster risk 
management: NGOs (mostly domestic) with missions focused on DRM, NGOs (mostly 
international) working in other sectors that provided relief and support for reconstruction 
following the 2015 earthquakes, and governmental agencies with a focus on development 
and the financial resources to support large-scale projects. While NSET remains separate 
from many of these organizational networks, it has cultivated an important financial 
partnership with USAID. Since NSET's founding, USAID has played a key role in 
NSET's ability to implement projects, and their relationship has shifted from one focused 
on NSET implementing USAID-developed projects to one where NSET is actually able 
to present its own proposals for funding. I also briefly touch on critiques of other 
organizations, including the Nepal Red Cross Society and UNDP, to situate NSET’s 
position in the field. Despite NSET's limited networking with other organizations at the 
moment, I advocate for greater collaboration on disaster risk management that would 
provide increasingly effective risk reduction, NSET's ultimate goal. I develop the 
example of the health sector where incorporation of DRM into projects would promote 
sustainable health initiatives, which can enhance resiliency and reduce health risks in 
future disasters. Additionally, establishing networks and communication across 
organizations and projects at the current stage in Nepal, between disasters, would 
increase efficiency, avoid duplication of projects, and successfully reach more of Nepal's 
population in a future earthquake. 
In Chapter 6, I focus on the community, the cornerstone of NSET's work in 
disaster risk management. The community is key to timely search and rescue operations 
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and support, particularly in a country like Nepal, where challenging geography and 
limited infrastructure can delay governmental and official responses after an earthquake. 
Additionally, implementation of disaster risk reduction programs is most effective at the 
community level, through the development and support of community groups. I frame my 
chapter around NSET's social mobilizers, individuals trained in the social sciences who 
act as interpreters between the community's perceptions of risk and NSET's engineers. I 
then address NSET's implementation of two programs – the community-based disaster 
management committees and the Baliyo Ghar program. For the former, I draw on 
research conducted with individuals from two committees in the Kathmandu Valley that 
have been active since the early 2000s, and for the latter, I include a case study from 
Baruwa, a small town in the Dolakha district where the program has been implemented 
since early 2016. I argue that the social mobilizers are key for increasing risk awareness 
in communities and presenting NSET's scientifically-based projects and risk perception 
in a socially-acceptable manner. Additionally, I identify three key components for 
community-based DRM work (CBDRM): funding, equity, and sustainability. I argue that 
NSET is realistic about funding limitations and develops its projects to maximize 
sustainability. This allows programs to be successful, even when continued funding and 
involvement is unavailable - a crucial component for DRM in Nepal. However, 
equitability in programs, especially recognition of the disparate impacts of natural 
disasters and the need for additional support for marginalized communities, continues to 
be underrepresented in NSET's community work. 
Finally, my conclusion will bring these elements together to argue for coherence 
in NSET’s approach to disaster risk management and to connect its work as an institution 
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to broader discussions of disaster risk management as a field in Nepal. I will also connect 
the discussion back to questions of risk, risk perception, and disaster as I provide some 
analysis more broadly of the effectiveness of NSET’s approaches. 
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Chapter 2 – Risk, Danger, and Risk Perception 
The field of disaster risk management has seen growth and widespread acceptance 
in recent decades and in Nepal, organizations like the National Society for Earthquake 
Technology (NSET) began to contribute significantly to risk management on the ground 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Around the same time, anthropologists also began to 
grapple with similar concepts, especially with Mary Douglas’ publications on pollution, 
taboo, risk, and culture (including Douglas 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Since 
then, these two fields, anthropology and disaster risk management, have developed their 
own site of conflict, where disaster risk management, more broadly, focuses on a 
scientific perception of risk while failing to adequately recognize and incorporate the 
cultural dimension of anthropological theory on risk perception. 
Intersecting with literature on risk is the literature on disasters, which are seen as 
the “risky” outcomes of an event in society. Disasters, as conceptualized within 
anthropology, can encompass a wide range of events but are ultimately disruptive to 
broader societal processes. Oliver-Smith writes that a disaster is a process or event 
“involving the combination of a potentially destructive agent(s) from the natural and/or 
technological environment and a population in a socially and technologically produced 
condition of vulnerability” (1996:305). Accompanying a broader shift in anthropology 
away from the nature-culture divide, there has been a shift within the disaster theoretical 
framework from a conception of these hazardous processes as extreme, unpredictable 
events to a more basic element of nature, society, and culture (Oliver-Smith 1996:305). 
However, these disasters remain “all-encompassing occurrences,” which disrupt the 
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environmental, biological, and sociocultural, and require a reformation of processes for 
society to continue functioning (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999:1).  
While disasters are constructed culturally6, natural disasters, the focus of this 
paper, are nearly universally recognized as disruptive to society, and causing harm to life 
and property. Oliver-Smith and Hoffman break down the discussion of disasters into 
either “objectively identifiable phenomen[a]” or “subjective socially constructed 
process[es]” (1999:22). However, I argue that different cultural perspectives of disasters, 
and therefore of the risks themselves, stem from different understandings of why a 
disaster occurs and what the most significant aspects are during and after – the period of 
most disruption. Therefore, a natural disaster can simultaneously be an objectively 
identifiable phenomenon and a subjective socially constructed process. This can be 
reinforced with literature on similar mass events; in Ruptures and Repairs in South Asia, 
Yogesh Raj notes that ruptures are distinct from “the gradual and matter-of-course 
changes” because of their “unpredictability, and urgent recuperating events following the 
events” (2013:1). In this instance, I argue that the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal do 
constitute a rupture, which can be conceptualized socially, while at the same time 
remaining objective phenomena shaped by plate tectonics and conceptualized 
scientifically by organizations like NSET. 
At the root of discussions about risk lies the question of who defines what and 
how significant various risks are. The answer parallels that of natural disasters, where 
they can be viewed through the so-called objective and subjective lenses. Prior to every 
disaster, there are identifiable risks, which are typically delineated along an objective-
subjective framework. The idea of risk has its origins in probability and hard science. 
                                                
6 (Hewitt. 1983, Interpretations of Calamity. As cited by Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999:2) 
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Mary Douglas’s writings are the seminal works on risk theory in Anthropology and 
provide a foundation for more recent theoretical investigations into risk, risk perception, 
and disasters. In Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992), she begins with an 
overview of the term risk itself, describing how early applications of the idea of risk 
referred to mathematical likelihood that an outcome (positive or negative) would occur 
(1992:24-25). Tansey and Raynor provide a similar history of risk’s early applications in 
terms of a costs and benefits analysis of financial transactions (2008:59). However, both 
write that risk has become synonymous only with the possibility of negative outcomes 
(Tansey and Raynor 2008:59; Douglas 1992:24). NSET’s work is rooted in this scientific 
conception of risk – since risk is determined by geologic research on the seismic nature 
of the Nepal region, the likelihood of another earthquake based on plate tectonics, 
statistically-based models of what caused the most casualties in the 2015 earthquakes, 
and seismic engineering rooted in models tested on earthquake shake tables. 
The subjective conception of risk is typically referred to as risk perception and 
denotes cultural understandings of risk. In some instances, risk perception has also been 
utilized with regards to scientific risk, and whether individuals have an understanding of 
the “objective” risks present. This use of risk perception to denote relative understanding 
of scientific risk occurs primarily outside the field of anthropology and is illustrated by 
NSET’s “risk perception surveys,” which serve as the building blocks for implementation 
of their educational programs. However, risk perception will typically be used in 
reference to cultural understandings and “subjective” risk, in which anthropological 
understandings of risk have typically been rooted. As Douglas writes, “[risk] is not a 
thing, it is a way of thinking, and a highly artificial contrivance at that” (1992:46). 
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Similarly, “hazard perception and construction, risk calculation and even the definition of 
calamity, and the way these concepts are contested” are also key to the study of disasters 
in anthropology (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999:8).  
These differing risk conceptions are typically viewed as a binary, where the 
objective scientific risk is placed in opposition to subjective cultural risk. These differing 
conceptions of risk – “scientific risk” and “risk perception” – come into conflict when 
implementing disaster risk management programs. Disaster research has traditionally 
focused on the material and structural aspects, including material loss and affected social 
structures and disaster risk management is focused on reducing risk, conceived as a 
reduction of the material losses and damage when an event occurs. Yet, as I have 
established above, risk also refers to broader cultural narratives, and risk reduction based 
on these conceptions may address very different issues when implemented. Oliver-Smith 
writes that risk is problematic epistemologically because: 
It [risk] is subject to differential construction by the various parties involved. 
Traditionally the purview of engineers, health physicists, statisticians, and 
epidemiologists, risk is defined probabilistically according to ‘real’ risk, 
determined scientifically and objectively, vs ‘perceived’ risk by the public, 
assumed to be uninformed, false, illusory, or irrational. In contrast, 
anthropologists entering the field have tended to emphasize nonprobabilistic 
approaches, conceptualizing risk in its sociocultural context. (1996:319)  
However, this epistemological difference may not be as distinctly defined as many argue 
that it is.  
Instead, scientific conception of risk is in itself a cultural conception. In 
addressing the intersection between risk, environmentalism, and the key cultural factors 
that have driven both into prominence, Grove-White notes, “scientific procedures are 
held up publicly as providing ‘proof’ and as therefore able to define and identify ‘fact’ in 
the field” (1993:22). However, he argues that “science itself exists as a social construct, 
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in which doctrines of ‘objective’ practice rest on a web of conventions, practices, 
understandings and ‘negotiated’ indeterminacies (Grove-White 1993:22). This becomes 
clear in an organization like NSET, which was founded and led largely by engineers and 
seismologists, where the institutional culture privileges the scientific above other 
perceptions of risk.  
If risks are largely constructed, rather than one universal fact, how are these risks 
conceived, represented, and responded to by individuals and cultures? In Risk and 
Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (1982), 
Douglas and Wildavsky lay out an assessment of the creation, identification, and reaction 
to “risk,” arguing that risk is a collective construct of society. The essay seeks to answer 
the question of how “particular kinds of danger” are selected as risky, with an emphasis 
on pollution and environmental risk. Douglas and Wildavsky posit that individuals 
develop their beliefs in a particular social context relative to how they act and that 
judgments of what constitutes a risk are made within a specific social and cultural 
environment (1982:9, 14). Additionally, in Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory 
(1992), Douglas expands on her earlier connections between risk and culture to grapple 
with questions of who is at fault in the event of a disaster, risk reduction, and the 
politicization of risk.  
These beliefs are shaped especially by social organization and must inherently be 
selective to limit possible risks to an acceptable level (Tansey and Raynor 2008:54). 
According to Tansey and Raynor, the risks themselves are not typically debated, but 
rather it’s the “magnitude of the risks and… who is responsible for them” that varies 
from one society to another (2008:58). Ultimately, these judgments, like the judgments of 
  
Shriner 29 
what constitutes a risk, are made within a specific social and cultural environment 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982:14). Additionally, Douglas describes how, when 
considering risk perception, one must consider “the bearing of the particular risk on the 
individual risk-perceiver’s purposes, whether it is seen as integral to them or peripheral,” 
as well as what kind of community the risk-perceiver is a part of and “whether the risk is 
thought to affect the individual or the collective good” (1992:46-47). This can be seen in 
my research through how individuals discuss earthquake-resistant technology, who is 
responsible for the fact that their house collapsed in the last earthquake, and what their 
concerns are for a future earthquake. 
Douglas sets forth a preliminary approach to conducting comparative research in 
communities in determining these risks. She writes that one must consider the “bearing of 
the particular risk on the individual risk-perceiver’s purposes, whether it is seen as 
integral to them or peripheral,” as well as what kind of community the risk-perceiver is a 
part of and “whether the risk is thought to affect the individual or the collective good” 
(Douglas 1992:46-47). This correlates with broader methodologies to address the 
relationship between certain functions of society and the relationships between 
communities and their physical and social environments. Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 
further expand on this; in discussing the methodological difficulties in studying risk 
perception, they write that matters of risk perception “address theoretical questions about 
the cultural construction of reality [and that] they further incorporate ideologies of social, 
physical, and cosmological settings” (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999:9).  
Risk perception must play a significant role in disaster risk management and 
research related to disasters as it shapes individuals’ understandings of the necessary 
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preparation, the event itself, and personal, community, and institutional responses. As 
addressed above, individual risk perceptions depend on cultural understandings and 
values. These can also shape disaster preparedness at the governmental or institutional 
level; in these situations, lack of preparedness or capacity to respond to a disaster may 
“reflect[] a general absence of societal and cultural prioritization of the need to build such 
expertise” (Ravi Rajan 2002:240). 
Within this recognition of the many factors shaping risk perception, how can 
anthropology and the field of disaster risk management reconcile two (or more) very 
different conceptions of risk? This theoretical framework on risk perception provides one 
of the guiding theories for my research on the National Society for Earthquake 
Technology’s (NSET’s) work on disaster risk management in Nepal. I identify two 
primary forms of risk perception present in Nepal – the scientific, “objective” perception 
and the indigenous, “subjective” perception. In my evaluation of NSET’s relationship 
with the government, other organizations, and the community, I incorporate an analysis 
of how it navigates these differing risk perceptions to successfully (or unsuccessfully) 
implement DRM programming. With a background in engineering and geological 
research, NSET as an institution operates primarily in scientific perceptions of risk, 
which it builds upon to receive funding from organizations like USAID and to develop 
training programs for armed forces domestically and abroad. At the same time, NSET, 
through the position of the social mobilizer, seeks to engage with communities that may 
have different perceptions of risk. Additionally, evaluation of what is considered 
“successful” implementation of DRM programming (especially in risk reduction) is 
rooted fundamentally in what is considered a risk and by whom.  
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NSET’s social mobilizer program model and its emphasis on education fit well 
into some discussions on risk perception. Boholm describes how the “metric model of 
risk perception involves dimensions such as a knowledge, degree of novelty and 
familiarity, degree of personal control and catastrophic potential” (Boholm 2003:161). In 
this conception of risk perception, education, when led at the community level, can 
address three of these four aspects (all but catastrophic potential) and encourage 
appropriate preparation and management of risks. Boholm, building on ideas set forth by 
Purcell (2000) and Douglas & Wildavsky (1982), also states that these “decisions about 
risk and management of risk are socially embedded, shaped by culturally based notions 
about the state of the world, what the world consists of and how it works” (as cited in 
Boholm 2003:161). Education programs can still face significant limitations based on 
their approach to different conceptions of risk. 
Additionally, effectiveness of disaster risk management programming, especially 
as designed and implemented by NSET, relies on discussion of risk. Wolfe provides us 
with some guidance on how to approach this aspect in her piece on risk communication 
(1988). She writes that risk communication is typically viewed as a “formal process… in 
which professional communicators transfer technical information about potentially or 
actually hazardous items or events” to some constituency of a broader public (Wolfe 
1988:13), which can be seen in NSET’s work despite its attempts to facilitate 
conversations with the community. Instead, disaster risk management organizations could 
emphasize two-way risk communication, through both formal and informal channels. 
While only a start, two-way dialogues would promote an important shift away from a 
hierarchal valuation of scientific risk versus cultural perceptions of risk. In disaster risk 
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management and NSET’s work, this could take the form of working with communities to 
address more than the scientifically conceived risks. 
While NSET considers itself and its program implementation largely successful, it 
recognizes limitations in community response to the idea of scientific risk. Bijay 
Upadhyay, a former engineer who heads the Urban Disaster Risk Management (UDRM) 
office at NSET, said that “time is a great healer… The problem, the challenge for us is 
how to continue this motivation that has been raised by the earthquake” when discussing 
how individuals who were concerned after the earthquake have returned to seismically 
unsafe building practices. I argue that these limitations are based in NSET’s disregard of 
cultural risk perception due to its “subjectivity” and the fact that it is considered an 
obstacle to scientific conceptions of risk. Though challenging to incorporate into 
implementation of risk management, organizations like NSET must be able to 
conceptualize and act on these multiplicities of risk and risk perceptions in order to be 
effective. Instead of viewing differing perceptions as an obstacle and danger, 
organizations like NSET could seek to recognize the legitimacy of these perceptions and 
allow their programming to reflect different conceptions. 
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Chapter 3 – Setting and Institutional Background 
Recent political history of Nepal 
NSET’s founding must first appropriately be situated within the broader political 
narrative in Nepal, especially the increases in development following the 1950-51 
Revolution. Nepal emerged as a country in 1768, when Prithvi Narayan Shah, king of 
Gorkha, conquered the Kathmandu valley (Shakya 2009:13). Territorial expansion ended 
following military losses to the East India Company in 1816, and Nepal developed 
increasingly isolationist policies. From 1846 to 1951, Nepal was ruled by the Ranas, a 
family that kept control of the prime ministership, and which instituted a national caste 
system that reinforced the privilege of those in power. 
The period following the 1950-51 Revolution, with its mostly failed attempt at 
democracy and a multi-party system, was marked by an interest in modernization and 
connecting Nepal to the broader world. This took place concurrently with increasing 
foreign aid worldwide following World War II, designed to assist “Third World” 
countries, many of which were former colonies. Numerous projects were put into place in 
the name of modernization and development, including “social services, such as schools 
and hospitals; the infrastructure of roads, bridges, and dams; the economic initiatives 
such as land reform; the training and mobilization of a national elite; [and] the 
administrative organization of agencies and manpower” (Pigg 1993:45). Pigg writes that 
“ideologically, development served simultaneously as the basis for Nepal’s relations to 
the rest of the world and as a rallying cry in a political project for national society as a 
whole” (Pigg 1993:49). Ultimately, many of these projects actually promoted the Rana 
administration and state power, as they allowed ideological spreading into the more rural 
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areas of Nepal (Onta and Tamang 2014:318). They also lay the foundation for much of 
the infrastructure and infrastructure design that the Government of Nepal, NSET, and 
other NGOs are working with today with disaster risk management (DRM).  
Development further established the centrality of foreign aid and non-
governmental organizations in Nepal that continues to this day, informing subfields 
including health, DRM, and education. Between 1951-52 and 1986-87, Nepal received 
more than Rs. 25 billion in foreign aid, which, for the last 11 years of that period, 
increased at a rate of 17 percent per annum (Pigg 1993:47). In early years, India and the 
United States were the most significant contributors, often gifting large grants; the 1960s 
saw an increased presence from the UK, Switzerland, China, and the United Nations 
(Onta and Tamang 2014:319; Pigg 1993:47). By the 1990s, more recent decades had seen 
a shift from these grants to loans, but they remained a significant part of the Government 
of Nepal’s budget (Pigg 1993:47). However, starting an NGO during this time, especially 
one recognized by the government, was extremely difficult in Nepal (Onta and Tamang 
2014:319). 
Following a long period of uncertain government rule, and the People’s 
Movement (Jana Andolan) of January-April 1990, the Panchayat system gave way to a 
newly democratic, multiparty system that existed until 2002. The 1990 Constitution 
included a bicameral Parliament with a 205-member House of Representatives and a 60-
member National Assembly; now a constitutional monarch, this system strongly limited 
the King’s sole executive power as acts were required to be approved by both branches of 
Parliament and the King to become law. Additionally, deploying the army required the 
recommendation of the National Defence Council, removing full control from both the 
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King and the civilian government (Onta and Tamang 2014:302). At its core, this party-
based parliamentary system still forms the basic foundation of modern Nepali politics. 
The number of NGOs in Nepal has increased dramatically since 1990, in large part due to 
freedoms to form associations guaranteed in the new constitution and a shift in the global 
narrative that emphasized political and economic liberalization and shifted foreign aid 
support towards civil society actors (Onta and Tamang 2014:319). 
The narrative surrounding foreign aid and the focus on NGOs in Nepal was 
shifted during the Maoist Insurgency and People’s Movements of Nepal, from 1996 to 
2006. In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) set forth their demands 
to the Nepali state and began a ten-year conflict (the Maoist Insurgency) with the ultimate 
goal of making Nepal into a “people’s republic” (Onta and Tamang 2014:305). During 
this time, debate continued regarding the appropriate role of development and foreign aid 
in Nepal, especially from USAID. An article published in 2001 in the Nepali Times, 
pointed to the correlation between a USAID development project executed between 1980 
and 1995 in the Rapti Zone and the fact that, by 1998, three of the nine Maoist bases were 
located there, suggesting that USAID’s goal of improving individual and community 
well-being had directly supported the Maoists (Mainali 2004:125). Instead, Mainali 
argued that Nepal would be better off resolving the conflict on their own, between the 
government and the Maoists, before again allowing donor influence and presence. Others 
debated the utility of donor intervention; Thapa and Sijapati note that the US$500 million 
pledged annually by foreign donors, beginning in 2002, would not be of much benefit 
unless security across the country improved (Thapa with Sijapati 2007:145). The conflict 
officially ended on November 21, 2006, after King Gyandera stepped down in April 2006 
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and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Maoists (Onta and Tamang 
2014:286, 308). 
The new government became the “Government of Nepal” as opposed to “His 
Majesty’s Government” and Nepal became officially a secular state. Elections continued 
in the following years, with continued efforts to develop an official constitution. In recent 
years, Nepal once again began the process of formulating a new government and national 
constitution, as Ram Baran Yadav took office in 2008, under the official title of President 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. This constitutional process was informed 
by the 2015 earthquakes as a desire for stability lead to parties putting aside their disputes 
over certain issues in the interest of passing the new constitution in September of that 
year. The current president, Bidhya Devi Bhandari, was elected shortly after, in October 
2015. However, this version of the constitution is said to have contributed to continued 
political and economic insecurity as a significant subsection of the population viewed it 
as non-inclusive (Anderson and Baruah 2016).   
Through out history, Nepali politics and society have continued to be dominated 
by members of the high castes, especially Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar. A survey of caste 
and ethnicity in governance in 1999, including members of the judiciary, cultural 
organizations and association leaders, Parliament, industry leaders, and central members 
of national political parties, found that over 66 percent of individuals were Caste Hill 
Hindu Elite and a further 15 percent were Newar, while these two groups made up 31.6 
percent and 5.6 percent of the population, respectively (Lawoti  2007:14). However, 
Nepal remains an extremely multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, with no emergent 
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ethnic majority, and organizations have continued to focus on bridging the well-
established divides and inequalities. 
 
Disaster risk management (DRM) 
Over the past fifty years, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster risk 
management (DRM) have moved from national and international support following 
disasters into global conversations across sectors about proactive measures and 
approaching it as a more complex process that could be incorporated into sustainable 
development. In 1987, the United Nations took on this conversation, passing a resolution 
that called for 1990-1999 to be the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 
in recognition of “the importance of reducing the impact of natural disasters for all 
people, and in particular for developing countries” (UNISDR, “History”). Amod Dixit 
was able to attend a conference related this movement in the early 1990s, spurring the 
foundation of NSET concurrently with the broader growth of the NGO field in Nepal. In 
the following years, two key frameworks have shaped the conversation – the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030.  
Nepal joined the table later and conversations about the broader DRM field only 
really began in the early 1990s, likely due to low prioritization by the Government of 
Nepal at a time when civil society actors did not have as much freedom; like many other 
sectors, proliferation of NGOs related to DRM was likely slowed under the Panchayat 
system’s restrictions on social association (Onta and Tamang 2014:319). However, the 
early 1990s saw rapid growth in the DRM field in Nepal, largely at the NGO level but 
  
Shriner 38 
with significant support from other sectors and actors. Nepal observed the International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) day for the first time in 1992 (NSET, 
“Disaster Risk Management in Nepal”), connecting the country with international 
discussions about disaster preparedness. While NSET (founded 1993) considers itself to 
the be the first major group working on DRM in Nepal, organizations like the Disaster 
Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal, founded 1996) and the Nepal Red Cross 
Society (NRCS, increased emphasis on DRM, especially at the community level, around 
1997) also emerged in the following years. Attempts to engage other actors included a 
training course on disaster journalism in 1995 in an effort to get the media involved 
(NSET, “Disaster Risk Management in Nepal”).  
Since that time, DRM in Nepal has grown into a larger field incorporating actors 
from a broad array of backgrounds including the government, NGOs, international 
agencies, and domestic and international scientists. Key organizations include NSET, 
DPNet-Nepal, NRCS, and the National Center for Disaster Management (NCDM) (see 
Chapter 5 for more information about these organizations). At the official level, the 
Government of Nepal does not have a centralized branch for DRM; the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MoHA) serves as the focal point for most disaster management programming, 
but lacks a distinct department. Key national policies have included Natural Calamities 
Relief (1982), the National Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (2009), and the 
National Disaster Response Framework (2013).  
Since the 2015 earthquakes, DRM has become a more central part of the national 
narrative, especially with regards to the response component. While mired in early 
controversy and leadership struggles, the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) has 
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been the center of rebuilding Nepali communities through documentation of destruction, 
promotion of earthquake-resistant building designs, and limited funds to assist with 
reconstruction. After an initial period of open aid and response from the international 
community, the national government sought to limit independent donations and work, 
and all funds had to go through the government apparatus. However, a year after the 
initial earthquake, the NRA reversed this position and “endorsed guidelines that allowed 
INGOs and NGOs to work in reconstruction” (Anderson and Baruah 2016). In 2017, 
there was increased conversation, both within the government and externally, about 
creating a more central branch to approach DRM more broadly and suggestions that the 
NRA could take on this more inclusive role. 
 
NSET: Foundations for DRM work 
Like many disaster management groups, the story of NSET’s founding is itself 
rooted in a past disaster. The Udaipur earthquake of 1988 served as a wake up call about 
the importance of disaster management and mitigation for many in Nepal, including the 
future founder of NSET, Amod Dixit. At the time, he was working with the Nepal 
government’s Department of Mines and Geology and, following that earthquake, went 
into the field to complete intensity mapping, going village-to-village and asking people if 
they had felt the shaking. In one of the villages, he stopped at a large government-owned, 
half-collapsed warehouse being used to store rice. There, all of the men had gone home to 
their families except for one low-ranking security guard who had been ordered to stay. 
He’d lost a child in the earthquake, his wife was badly injured, his own house had 
suffered, and he was increasingly frustrated both at being unable to go home and at the 
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government officials who came, looked around, and left. As Amod Dixit tells it, when he 
thanked the guard for letting him look around, the man told him “you are government 
officials. You ride in good cars. Your driver is well dressed and you go now to a better 
place. You eat good things. But what remains is our fate.” After spending the night 
talking to this man about his experiences, Amod began to blame himself in part for the 
destruction and 751 deaths. Ultimately, he wondered to himself, “could you have done 
anything that would have reduced the loss? If yes, why did you not do that?” While 
initially he did not have an answer to these questions, he quit his position in the 
government and began working as a consultant on the newly developing Building Code, 
before ultimately helping to found NSET in 1993 as an NGO. 
The National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET), or Bhookampa 
Pravidhi Rashtriya Samaj Nepal, was officially founded June 18, 1993, with the guiding 
goal of “Earthquake Safe Communities in Nepal by 2020.” This formational meeting was 
convened by Amod Mani Dixit and Mahesh Nakarmi, and “was attended by around 15 
professionals from the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning and its departments, 
seismologists, university professors, civil engineers and journalists” (“About NSET”). 
About a year later, on April 28, 1994, NSET was officially registered as an organization 
with the District Administration Office with the following objectives: 
● To raise public awareness in order to reduce loss of lives and damages 
caused by earthquakes; 
● To contribute towards the development and use of science and technology 
related to earthquakes; 
● To play an active role in safeguarding the country against earthquakes and 
to reduce earthquake risk by developing and implementing scientific 
measures; 
● To encourage professionalism and scientific ethics in the sector; and  
● To further the objectives and policies of the International Association for 
Earthquake Engineering as applicable to Nepal, and 
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● To provide emergency assistance to communities impacted by an 
earthquake  
(“About NSET”) 
Four years later, NSET was also registered with the Social Welfare Council on August 
10, 1998 (“17th NSET Day”). While NSET’s official statute has been amended twice 
since 1994, with an increasing emphasis on education and support of work in DRM by 
other sectors, these core objectives remain at the center of NSET’s work in the field. 
NSET serves both the people of Nepal and the Nepali government, conducting 
both research and DRM programs. Amod Dixit describes NSET with pride as a “fully 
Nepali organization”; unlike many of the INGOs working on DRM in Nepal now, NSET 
is an NGO founded in Nepal, by Nepalis, working with and for other Nepalis. Amod’s 
personal guiding principle is the idea that “if [he] can save just one life” his work will be 
worth it; NSET’s mission statement runs parallel, stating that its goal is “to assist all 
communities in Nepal to become earthquake-safer by developing and implementing 
organized approaches to managing and minimizing earthquake risks." NSET’s 
relationship with the government is reportedly mixed; while thought of highly at the 
individual level, NSET has occasionally run into conflicts with government departments 
over implementation of programs and conflicts over whose field of power certain 
responsibilities and activities fall under. Overall though, in interviews with leaders from a 
variety of community groups, NGOs, and INGOs, NSET’s work is seen as a guide in the 
field of DRM in Nepal. Its main funding comes from three sources: USAID grants (now 
mostly for programs that NSET creates and pitches), fee-based consulting services (in 
Nepal and the greater South Asia region), and support from other organizations, mostly 
INGOs. 
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NSET’s work is largely focused on research and implementation of DRM 
programs aimed at all sectors of the population. Following the 1988 earthquake, Amod 
Dixit was increasingly frustrated and concerned about the state of DRM in Nepal based 
on the complete lack of information the government could provide about the disaster and 
their reliance on scientists in India and the United States. Thus the goal of NSET’s 
research is to increase Nepal’s leadership in the area and to advance the broader scientific 
field around earthquakes and other disasters. However NSET also strives to move beyond 
just talking about theory – Amod Dixit emphasized the necessity of actual action because 
theory on its own does not help save lives (Kathmandu NSET – Interview). 
Two of the main NSET programs active before the last earthquake were the 
Building Code Implementation Program Nepal (BCIPN) and the Program for Enhanced 
Emergency Response (PEER). BCIPN worked in a number of districts, including 
Dolakha District where my research was conducted, and focused at the regional level on 
education and enforcement of the use of the 1992 building code. At this point, no formal 
reports have been published about its effectiveness, but USAID is hoping to complete a 
project comparing the number of casualties and collapsed buildings in districts affected in 
the 2015 earthquakes where it had been implemented and those affected districts where it 
had not been (USAID – Interview). 
The second program, PEER, works with professionals from both Nepal and 
surrounding countries, implementing trainings on search and rescue, stabilizing, and 
hospital readiness (a sub-program titled HOPE). Initial reports show that these trainings 
were very effective in the 2015 earthquakes because, as a regional program, teams from 
neighboring countries like India had undergone the same training as Nepali forces and 
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were able to effectively and easily coordinate their response (Kathmandu NSET – 
Interview; Kunda Dixit – Interview; USAID – Interview).  
Other programs have included the School Earthquake Safety Programme (SESP) 
and Promoting Public Private Partnership for Earthquake Risk Management (3PERM). 
SESP began in 1999 and since then has been implemented in more than 42 schools, 
mostly in the Kathmandu Valley (NSET, “SESP”). Its guiding principles include both 
raising “awareness of earthquake risks and preparedness of teachers, students, local and 
government officials, and local communities” and improving structural integrity of 
schools through retrofitting existing or construction of new buildings. 3PERM ran from 
October 2011 to April 2016, with funding support from USAID, initially as a three-year 
program with its extension through 3PERM Stage II (NSET, “3PERM”). The program 
was aimed at raising awareness and commitment to earthquake safety among “all 
stakeholders,” especially in the private sector, with the potential to then exert pressure on 
the government to mainstream DRM into the development process. Under 3PERM, 
NSET and USAID worked with the Bankers Association and the Insurance Association 
of Nepal to limit available loans and insurance for construction projects that did not 
follow building code policy and to include a message that read “are you prepared?” on 
the screens of ATMs to encourage disaster preparedness (Santosh Gyawali, USAID – 
Interview). Following the 2015 earthquake, NSET’s main two programs are a 
continuation of the PEER program and the new Baliyo Ghar program. 
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 Figure 1: NSET’s Community Earthquake Learning Center (CELC) 
 
NSET’s national office is located in Lalitpur in the Kathmandu Valley, with the 
Community Earthquake Learning Center (CELC) taking center stage. CELC was built 
and dedicated for the 16th anniversary of NSET’s founding, in June 2009. With the 
guiding purpose of being an “autonomous and financially self sustained public 
institution,” it was to serve as a museum, research station, and training ground in addition 
to hosting the offices of NSET’s administration (NSET, “NSET Celebrates 16th 
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Anniversary!”). It was also built as a gold standard for responsible, disaster-conscious 
construction; it is “envisioned to serve as a model for earthquake resistant construction, 
use of various forms of alternative energy like solar/wind energy…, back-up [sic] power 
for some equipment, and environment friendly and energy efficient building” (NSET, 
“NSET Celebrates 16th Anniversary!”). 
Arriving at CELC, just inside the secure gates, one’s eye is drawn to the 
Earthquake Safety Monument, centered in the drive beneath the somewhat imposing 
building. Dedicated for the 17th NSET Day, June 2010, the white marble humanoid 
sculpture was carved by Mr. Prithvi Narayan Shrestha. The red marble base reads 
“Possible devastations due to earthquake disasters can be reduced by human wisdom, 
studies and remedial methods”7 (translated to English, NSET, “17th NSET Day 
Celebrated”). To one side, the Bhuvaneshwari Temple occupies an important space. 
Bhuvaneshwari is given the epithet “Creator (or Co-creatix) of the World” and “is 
considered as the supreme goddesses who creates everything and destroys all of the 
unnecessary evils of the world… She is capable of turning situations according to her 
wish” (Nepal, “17th NSET Day Celebrated”). To the right, tucked against the wall, is a 
rust red shipping container, with “CSAR/BEMR EQUIPMENT” (Community Search and 
Rescue/Basic Emergency Medical Response) labeled on the side. Inside is an assortment 
of emergency supplies, rescue equipment, and more, kept both as an example and ready 
for any future disaster. 
Just inside the white building, there is a large, open entranceway, with a reception 
desk to the left, portraits and photographs hung across the way, and a curving staircase 
                                                
7 The message on the statue reads “Bhookampanam – Pragyopayam labham” in Sanskrit. English 
translation provided by NSET in “17th NSET Day Celebrated,” marking the opening of CELC. 
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wrapping its way to the second floor on the right. The bulletin board just to the right of 
the reception advertises upcoming events and is hung with posters promoting NSET’s 
programs and basic earthquake safety skills. Walking a little farther, there is a wall filled 
with brochures, handouts, and publications from NSET and associated international 
organizations over the last fifteen years. When I first met with Mr. Amod Dixit, I was led 
up the staircase – lined with yearly photos of the NSET staff on its anniversary, past the 
wall of key staff and founders, including scientists from New Zealand and the United 
States – into a grand office. With wood paneled shelves filled with books, plush seats, 
and variety of seating options, it was clear that NSET had more resources than many 
smaller NGOs operating in Nepal and had been invested in this building and spaces. 
Operations within NSET were conducted in both Nepali and English, with 
English highly prioritized and valued. Conversations among staff, for example the call 
from the reception to Mr. Dixit’s office upon my arrival, were held in Nepali but in most 
other cases, operations were conducted in English, even in instances were individuals 
were not fully comfortable utilizing the language. My interviews with NSET employees 
at the national office were conducted primarily in English, given the relative comfort 
levels of my informants in English as compared to my ability to address the complex 
topics in Nepali. However, when one employee felt less comfortable speaking in English, 
choosing his words carefully; rather than allowing the conversation to switch to Nepali, 
the two other individuals in the interview sought to “translate” for him, overly explaining 
concepts he had adequately presented and co-opting his interview. Additionally, site 
reports for Baliyo Ghar from the village teams were all completed in English, likely for 
ease in presenting results to USAID and other funding partners. NSET has also published 
  
Shriner 47 
a number of articles in international academic journals, hosted an international 
symposium on earthquake safety, and established strong professional relationships with 
organizations like USAID and the United Nations, where English is the primary 
professional language.  
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Chapter 4 – Relationship with the government 
Reports on the Government of Nepal’s response following the earthquake of April 
25th, 2015, are mixed. The earthquake hit on a Saturday, the weekly day off in Nepal, 
and while many officials with the Ministry of Home Affairs and other departments 
rushed into their offices in Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, it took days before the national 
government issued an official statement or response (Raj and Gautam 2015). In the days 
and months that followed, the government is credited with the foresight to open the 
airport 24 hours a day, setting up an emergency operations center to facilitate 
communications, and coordination by the department of health to deliver medical 
supplies and control epidemics8 (Bijay Upadhyay – Interview; Kunda Dixit – Interview). 
At the same time, the government failed to adequately utilize their existing knowledge on 
individuals, families, and communities, leading to ad hoc rescue and relief processes, 
and, ultimately, to many avoidable deaths from injuries sustained in the initial shaking 
and inadequate rescue (Raj and Gautam 2015). The reconstruction process has been 
equally mired in contradictions as the government has worked to assess safety and 
soundness of existing structures, provide (minimal) financial support for the rebuilding 
process, and develop sample building designs, while the National Reconstruction 
Authority (NRA) changes leadership and faces internal challenges. Regardless, the 
government remains a crucial actor in disaster risk management at the national scale.  
Especially today, with the international scale of disasters and relief, decisions by 
the government to facilitate preparedness before, provide a strong response during, and 
                                                
8 While the Ministry of Health found that “74% of water samples from the earthquakes affected area were 
reported not suitable for drinking purposes” and 20 cases of cholera were reported within one week at a 
hospital in Kathmandu in August of 2015, these cases remained relatively isolated and there were no major 
infectious disease outbreaks in the following months. (Adhikari et al 2016:2) 
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coordinate with international governmental and non-governmental organizations after a 
disaster can significantly shape the dynamics and impact of the disaster itself. Like other 
components of the disaster risk management (DRM) cycle, the government’s likelihood 
of a “successful” response can be managed and influenced before the disaster occurs with 
the expansion of programs, intentional creation of appropriate departments and systems, 
and the delegation of support and policy to DRM. However, in Nepal, like many other 
countries around the world, government preparation has proven to have room for 
improvement at the best, or be inadequate at the worst. 
At the governmental level in Nepal, there is a great degree of confusion, unclear 
distribution of power, and conflicting policies. The Government of Nepal does not have a 
clear branch of government devoted to disaster risk management, and lacks the acts with 
enforcement and organizational structure necessary for comprehensive and effective 
DRM policy, which can be summed up with the concept of “missing expertise.” As 
proposed by S. Ravi Rajan for civil administration and state institutions, missing 
expertise describes “the phenomenon wherein the production of the potential for risk is 
not matched by concomitant creation of expertise and institutions with the wherewithal to 
help mitigate a crisis, should one ensue” (Ravi Rajan 2002:237). Ravi Rajan identifies 
three categories of administrative expertise that may be “missing”: contingent, 
conceptual, and ethnographic (Ravi Rajan 2002:238). Within these three categories, 
contingent expertise – focused on preparation before a disaster for an immediate and 
effective response – is most relevant to my analysis of the relationship between NSET 
and the government. Conceptual expertise focuses on long-term rehabilitation plans, like 
the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA), as enacted following a disaster. 
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Ethnographic expertise addresses more nuanced aspects of the response and recovery 
process, including how government policy approaches inherent power differentials in 
society and the language used to communicate risk. While both of interest in broader 
anthropological analysis, they are outside the scope of this thesis and NSET’s core 
relationship with the government.  
NSET’s relationship with the government is one both of respect and tension over 
approaches to disaster risk management and domains of policy implementation. Despite 
tensions, NSET remains supportive of government potential and recognizes their useful 
(and critical) role in increasing disaster preparedness in Nepal and responding to future 
disasters. It should be noted that in its work, NSET does not attempt to replace the state, 
but rather identifies its role as supplemental to the workings of the state institution. 
Within this setting, I suggest that NSET could play a significant role in expanding the 
government’s contingent expertise through research to increase data and knowledge 
about hazards, continued support of policies that minimize the impacts of disasters, and 
training programs and guidance on risk communication. However, as NSET remains 
outside of the governmental structure as an NGO, it is unable to influence or improve the 
structure of the government at an organizational level, limiting its effectiveness within 
the framework.  
 
NSET’s relationship with the government 
 NSET’s history has been intertwined with the national government of Nepal since 
before it even began with the now-Executive Director, Amod Dixit, serving with the 
Department of Mines and Geology before he left to found the National Society for 
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Earthquake Technology. In between his two positions, he worked independently as a 
consultant for the government to develop an updated Building Code in the late 1980s. 
Since then, the relationship between NSET and the government has been one 
characterized by collaboration on projects and tension when visions, implementation, and 
approaches differ significantly. Anecdotally, NSET is thought of highly by individuals in 
the government, with many coming to work for the organization post-retirement, but has 
more of a “love-hate relationship” with the government overall because of programs that 
occasionally lead to conflicts over whose field of power a project falls under (Amod Dixit 
– Interview). However, over the years, NSET has also partnered with more than a dozen 
organizations under the Government of Nepal, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Local Development, Ministry of Education and Sports, 
the Department of Mines and Geology, the Armed Police Force, and the Nepal Bureau of 
Standards and Meteorology.  
Amod Dixit describes NSET as an organization that serves both the people of 
Nepal and the Nepali government in conducting research and Disaster Risk Management 
(DRM) programs. The National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in Nepal 
(NSDRM), a program implemented by the UNDP (Oct 2006 - July 2007) with technical 
support from NSET to develop DRM plans for the Government of Nepal that fulfilled the 
Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) is just one example of this. The NSDRM included 
drafted strategy documents for different sectors including Infrastructure and Physical 
Planning, Information, Coordination and Logistics, and Search and Rescue, laying an 
informed roadmap for government action. Other projects have included the Kathmandu 
Valley’s Earthquake Scenario, a guide and storybook published in both English and 
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Nepal to raise awareness about the possibility and impacts of an earthquake in the urban 
core, developed with financial support from USAID (Singh Basnet, et al 2004). All of 
these reports and strategy plans have been developed utilizing NSET’s resources as a 
research organization with national experience, its own seismic simulations, and 
connections to international seismic experts.  
However, flow on NSET’s projects is not only one-directional. Over the years, 
NSET and the national government have repeatedly collaborated on projects relating to 
the building code in Nepal, including its development and implementation. A strong 
building code is critical for earthquake risk reduction and a foundation of NSET’s 
philosophy – the back of each NSET business card reads “earthquakes don’t kill people, 
buildings do.” Bijay Upadhyay emphasized that the main hazard in an earthquake is weak 
buildings and he argued that “the only way that you can reduce the risk is to implement 
the building code properly.” However, it is the government that ultimately holds the 
responsibility and ability to create and effectively implement building code policy; the 
Department of Urban Development and Building Construction is responsible for this at 
the national level (Republica 2018). One program, the Building Code Implementation 
Program in Municipalities of Nepal (BCIPN), implemented by USAID and NSET 
beginning in 20149, worked to support government at the municipal level to develop and 
administer building permits and enforcement mechanisms through personnel trainings 
and capacity building, public awareness activities, and policy recommendations. 
Even throughout their collaboration, there may have been some tension between 
the government and NSET, especially in relation to the scope of the projects. There 
                                                
9 Originally intended to be a five year program, implementation of BCIPN was cut short in response to the 
2015 earthquakes and ended September 30th, 2016. (USAID)  
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appeared to be internal debate, especially before the 2015 earthquakes, over what scale 
projects should address; the government reportedly saw the building code as something to 
be implemented only on the municipal scale (for example, the BCIPN program), while 
NSET was interested in including a broader national focus. Additionally, experts from 
NSET have been vocal about their frustration with the national government; in a 2018 
article, Khadga Sen Oli stated that, “earlier, despite various regulations imposed by the 
government for implementation of the building code, the code was not strictly 
implemented” (Republica 2018). However, the 2015 earthquake has brought NSET’s and 
the government’s objectives closer. Bijay Upadhyay says “now the government has been 
convinced that it is not only for this area and that are, [the] building code is for every 
building in construction no matter the geographic area or political division.” NSET has 
also continued to work within frameworks established by the government; for example, 
the Baliyo Ghar program is listed as an official reconstruction program under the 
National Reconstruction Authority’s Build Back Better campaign. 
Additionally, programming for the National Earthquake Safety Day (ESD), held 
each year on the 15th or 16th of January since 1999, is developed with collaboration 
between the Ministry of Home Affairs and various other representatives from DRM 
organizations in Nepal, including NSET. For the 2018 events, as in the past, NSET 
served as the Member Secretary of the National Committee and the Publicity Campaign 
and Municipality for Management sub-committees (NSET, “Nepal Marking 20th 
Earthquake Safety Day”). This year’s event had the theme “Empowering communities 
and local government: strong foundation of earthquake safety” (Republica 2018), 
revealing underlying support for developing DRM programming effective beyond the 
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immediate reach of the national government and NSET. While many in the DRM 
networks in Nepal, including NSET officials, questioned the effectiveness of the ESDs 
and dismissed them as media ploys to display a superficial level of commitment to 
preparedness, the collaborative aspect between NSET and the government is significant. 
The high position of authority given to NSET in developing Ministry of Home Affairs 
programming shows a recognition of NSET as a leader in the DRM field, and with public 
outreach specifically, and provides a foundation for continued collaboration and 
consultations in other areas. 
NSET’s critique of the government centers around four main issues: the 
Government of Nepal’s perceived paradigm of disaster risk management that is less 
scientifically-focused than NSET’s, their historically ineffective implementation of 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs and measures, their general silence and lack of 
commitment in initial earthquake response, and their unrealistic programming for 
reconstruction. When asked what was not successful about the response to the 2015 
earthquakes, Bijay Upadhyay critiqued the government’s initial lack of clear direction, 
saying, “where there is a disaster like this, people in Nepal, the bureaucrats, the technical 
technocrats, politicians are always like that. They comment on what they cannot do 
without thinking what can be done, they just shy away from commitment. And that 
makes people miserable” (Interview). He described how the government was silent for 
almost a month after the earthquake occurred until they started talking about a donors’ 
conference, to raise money in order to rebuild by Dashain10. As NSET tried to publicize, 
this was not possible; NSET estimated it would take at least five years to rebuild, but 
                                                
10 A 15-day holiday celebrated each year in the Nepal Bikram Sambat month of Ashvin (September or 
October). 
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whether the government was intentionally misleading or simply directed by misinformed 
optimism, the build back estimates became a political issue. About that, Bijay Upadhyay 
said, “if I were prime minister, I would have told the truth,”11 an opinion that may 
represent an overly simplified take on the pressures and constraints the prime minister 
faced, but nonetheless expresses the frustration that Bijay Upadhyay and NSET felt. In 
some ways, the deepest disappointment didn’t rest with the politicians or even 
bureaucrats that Bijay Upadhyay expected to have these unrealistic estimates, but rather 
from the technical experts who supported these claims. 
These critiques about disaster response center around the government’s lack of 
“conceptual expertise.” Ravi Rajan’s description of conceptual expertise, or the ability to 
“devise long-term rehabilitation strategies and trouble-shoot them in practice” focuses 
especially on chronic disasters, like the 2015 Nepal earthquakes, where recovery is a 
slow process (2002: 241). In these cases, frameworks for immediate response and larger 
projects, like reconstruction under the newly-created National Reconstruction Authority 
(NRA) or economic rehabilitation programs, must be conceptualized and developed prior 
to occurrence of a disaster. And, in the case of Nepal 2015, NSET found the government 
to be lacking in their preparation and response – in Bijay Upadhyay’s words “no one has 
thought properly on how to rebuild or reconstruct. That’s it” (Bijay Updadhyay – 
Interview). 
                                                
11 The narrative for the “truth” that he used, in the persona of the prime minister, was: “We have never been 
in such a disaster. It will take a minimum of one year to count how many buildings damaged and finalize 
what is the amount to be provided. It will take at least six months to draft the system to put the mechanism 
in place so that all the buildings built after the earthquake will be earthquake resistant. We have to have the 
system. And we have to have people to implement that system and we have to train them – it will take 
another one year. So please don’t hesitate. It will take at least two years to start the reconstruction process. 
So for that, with the money the government has provided, please make your temporary shelters last more 
than five years” (Bijay Upadhyay – Interview) 
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 In contrast, NSET’s critiques about the Government of Nepal’s more general 
approach to risk and disaster risk management are much broader and historically rooted. 
Specifically, as an organization founded by engineers that prioritizes and places value on 
scientific understandings of hazards, risk, and disasters, NSET has struggled with the 
fatalism that is present historically in Nepal (see Dor Bahadur 2008; Watson 2017). Most 
Nepali government documents and acts still refer to natural disasters utilizing the 
terminology that translates literally to “deity disaster” or “god-sent disaster,” which Bijay 
Upadhyay says reflects a broader “what to do” attitude of the government. In general, 
rather than working to collaborate across this difference, NSET officials view it as an 
obstruction to reaching their ultimate goal of a prepared Nepal – thus placing the 
government itself as a source of conflict, rather than as an opportunity for collaboration 
and advancement towards a common goal. 
 The newly-elected local government, which, following elections in May of 2017, 
represents the first time that such a body has existed in over twenty years, presents new 
opportunities for collaboration and implementation of disaster risk management across 
Nepal. In recent years, local level organizations have played a key role in disaster risk 
management through the implementation of local disaster risk management planning 
guidelines (LDRMP) with grant incentives to municipalities that implement both the 
building code and LDRMP (Interview – Bijay Upadhyay). LDRMP serve as a system of 
planning guidelines that includes vulnerability and capacity assessments done by local 
groups and the implementation of a plan developed from these assessments. Bijay 
Upadhyay is hopeful that DRM work will continue successfully on the local level, as the 
national government has implemented a program called MCPM, Minimum 
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Conditions/Performance Measures, which will accelerate the process; Bijay Upadhyay 
also identified this process as a key step to NSET’s broader goal of “inserting disaster 
risk reduction elements into the government system” (Bijay Upadhyay – Interview). 
Additionally, leaders on Village Development Committees (VDCs), the previous iteration 
of local government, played an important role in responding to the 2015 earthquakes, 
where their advocacy for their communities in the months that followed, or not, often 
shaped the relief and support provided. These processes and the importance of 
government in DRM have the potential to be strengthened through the formal expansion 
of local authority. 
 
Expanding Contingent Expertise 
At a national level, NSET’s partner organizations include the Armed Police 
Force, Department of Mines and Geology, Department of Urban Development and 
Building Construction, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Home Affairs. Through these 
affiliations and their working relationship, NSET is able to provide support for contingent 
expertise, increasing the national government’s capacity to respond to a major disaster 
like the 2015 earthquakes. Contingent expertise, as defined by Ravi Rajan, “refers to an 
administration’s preparedness to respond immediately and effectively to a potential 
disaster” and requires “conscious adaptive mechanisms and institutions built by 
government prior to cataclysmic events” (2002:238). Components of contingent expertise 
include warning systems, evacuation procedures, effective communications systems, and 
setting up initial coordination meetings. Typically, missing contingent expertise is a 
result of the “scope of the hazard exceeding existing state capacity to cope with it,” which 
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Nepal, like most other countries, saw with a disaster the size of the 2015 earthquakes 
(Ravi Rajan 2002:240). While, as established previously, NSET’s critiques of the 
government include an emphasis on their lack of conceptual expertise, as evidenced by 
their response to the chronic disaster of the 2015 earthquakes, building contingent 
expertise will develop a stable base that will limit the devastation of a future disaster 
while also building broader governmental support and capacity with the entire field of 
DRM. 
 Building on previous programs, a partnership between NSET and the Government 
of Nepal has the potential to increase the government’s knowledge of disaster risk and 
capacity to respond, while also ensuring support for NSET policy implementation at the 
national level. Reports on the 2015 earthquakes have shown that all three components 
that most often lead to missing contingent expertise – partial hazard awareness, limited 
efforts to minimize threats or their impacts, and lack of adequate infrastructure – were 
present in the Government of Nepal’s preparation, but NSET can play a role in 
supporting steps to minimize each piece. Ravi Rajan writes that in each case of 
inadequate hazard awareness he studied, “the respective governments failed to scope out 
potential hazards and generate systematic data on possible threats” (2002:240). An 
extended cooperation between the Nepal Departments of Mines and Geology and NSET, 
as well as the Nepal Geological Society (NGS)12, could expand knowledge of hazard 
likelihood and existing threats stemming from those hazards, including landslide risk 
mapping, structural analyses, glacial lake monitoring, and infrastructure strength. 
                                                
12 The Nepal Geological Society was formed in 1980 by 39 Nepali engineers and geologists working for the 
Department of Mines and Geology, with the support of the Government of Nepal. It currently contains over 
850 members from Nepal and internationally and works out of an office within the Department of Mines 
and Geology. (Nepal Geological Society, “About Us”) 
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However, in Nepal, additional limitations with hazard awareness may persist, even with 
research support from NSET. When I interviewed two officials from USAID, they said 
that the information and data was readily available in Nepal, it was often just missed or 
overlooked because of inadequate corresponding institutions, which will be further 
addressed below.  
 The second key component of contingent expertise is minimization of the threat 
or the impact of that threat. While the Government of Nepal, and NSET, cannot minimize 
the probability of another major earthquake, they can take some steps to minimize the 
risks associated with related and concurrent disasters, as well as minimize the impact of 
the earthquake itself. Earthquakes often trigger landslides, which are already a risk in 
Nepal around the rainy season, especially with new road construction in hilly terrain, and 
exacerbated by deforestation. Proactive steps, including planting of trees alongside road 
construction projects and reinforcement of hillsides, informed by reports developed by 
NSET, the Department of Mines and Geology, and the Nepal Geological Society, can 
minimize the destruction caused by these concurrent disasters.  
Additionally, continued collaboration on building code policies and support of 
earthquake-resistant building techniques will dramatically decrease the human, material, 
and financial loss associated with major earthquakes. The benefits of strengthening of the 
building code and its implementation go beyond saving lives during the initial shaking of 
an earthquake; academics have found that the “risk of infectious disease outbreaks after 
disasters are minimal, unless there is a displacement of population with poor water and 
sanitation conditions” (Adhikari et al 2016:1). Ensuring that buildings, both personal 
homes and institutions, like schools and hospitals, do not collapse and are even still 
  
Shriner 60 
structurally sound enough for individuals to use in the immediate aftermath thus has 
significant impacts on health and general societal functions. Effective implementation on 
behalf of the government, supported by NSET’s research and cultural knowledge, could 
take the form of incentives for enforcement to offset financial interests in disregarding 
permitting regulations and regulation of local level policies. 
 Lastly, NSET can help the Government of Nepal expand its capacity and 
infrastructure to respond effectively to a disaster through training programs and guidance 
on risk communication. Programs like the Program for Enhancement of Emergency 
Response (PEER), a regional training program currently executed by USAID and NSET, 
has provided key trainings on emergency response for the Nepal Army and Nepal Armed 
Police Force in the past. Additional trainings could be held for government officials, 
similar to the disaster simulations that NSET and the Red Cross Society have held for 
local community groups. Though some motivation for DRM has dropped in the 
intervening years, following the 2015 earthquakes is a unique time to hold such trainings 
because individuals in the government are still aware of the need for strong DRM policies 
and can reflect on what went well and what collapsed in their previous response. In fact, 
over the last three years, the Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, and Nepal Police have 
“expanded the size of their disaster units and introduced various trainings as well as 
equipped them with new technologies for effective rescue and relief in the face of 
potential disaster” (Republica 2018). While NSET would also face limitations in this 
capacity in terms of actually developing or establishing effective risk communications 
systems and response organizations within the government, it could still serve an 
important consulting role, providing guidance for what an effective system could look 
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like. In this case, NSET’s expertise would be invaluable because of its long-standing 
community work, knowledge of the challenges and procedures for working within Nepal, 
and its scientific knowledge to support risk policies. 
 Expanding contingent expertise for disaster can also be coordinated with existing 
development goals for the Government of Nepal, with technical assistance and insight 
from NSET. This intersection between disaster and development was already explored in 
the NSDRM (2007) where eight different sectors were analyzed to develop sector-
specific programs for DRM and to “formulate the necessary policy decisions for 
facilitating mainstreaming DRM into the development process” (NSET, “NSDRM”). 
Coordinating development and DRM has a number of potential benefits including 
advancing governmental goals for improvement of sectors such as transportation and 
health, building resilience into these sectors allowing them to respond more successfully 
to disasters, and providing sustainability of disaster risk management through 
institutionalization and mainstreaming of policy, procedures, and material support.  
 However, as an NGO, NSET is limited in its capacity to fundamentally shift the 
organization of institutions and intergovernmental coordination that often is seen to limit 
the government’s ability to adequately design, respond to, and implement DRM 
programming for all stages of a disaster like the 2015 earthquakes. Santosh Gyawali, 
program specialist with USAID’s Disaster Risk Reduction, Reconstruction, and 
Resilience (DR4) office, said that “the government has all the powers possible 
structurally” with the central disaster relief committee, district committees, and more, but 
that “how much of those were functional [in 2015] and are functional and can be 
improved on” is unclear from a position outside the government itself (Santosh Gyawali, 
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USAID – Interview). Additionally, multiple government departments share overlapping 
areas of responsibility, with some as specific as the Department of Water Induced 
Disaster Management, leaving various aspects of DRM work in the Nepali government 
simultaneously “everyone’s responsibility and… nobody’s responsibility” (Santosh 
Gyawali, USAID – Interview). Getting to a point of operationalizing new or improved 
DRM programs at the governmental level is a goal of organizations like NSET and 
USAID, and individuals within the government itself. However, it may take a focused 
effort to redevelop the government structure around DRM – bridging divides between 
disaster response teams, different ministries, and different types of disasters to create a 
network of groups capable of making a higher level development impact with enhanced 
sustainability. Ultimately, as Mr. Gyawali identified, it will rely on bottom-up support 
from external groups like NSET and USAID, proper data management, and the 
government leading their own initiatives and projects, following a prioritization of DRM. 
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Chapter 5 – Relationship with other NGOs 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes, the average person in the 
United States, and around the world, became increasingly familiar with the vast array of 
organizations working in Nepal as requests for funding permeated Facebook, the news, 
and email list serves. The number of these organizations has risen dramatically since the 
1950s, when the first NGOs in Nepal were established. Between 1977 and 2014, 39,759 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were officially registered with the Social 
Welfare Council of the Government of Nepal and an additional 189 international NGOs 
(INGOs) (Karkee and Comfort 2016); while not all of NGOs are still active in the 
country today, many have maintained an active presence. Nepal has also received 
significant contributions from external development partners (EDPs), which includes 
foreign aid through governments, INGOs, and multilaterals (organizations formed by 
multiple nations). These groups collectively have supported projects across a wide 
network of sectors over the last 70 years, especially education, local development, roads, 
and health (Karkee and Comfort 2016). Within this assortment of organizations, I 
describe three categories relevant to disaster risk management (DRM): NGOs focusing 
on DRM, NGOs that played a role in the relief process following the 2015 earthquakes, 
and international governmental aid and development agencies. 
 NSET remains largely independent from most NGOs working in DRM and in 
other sectors in Nepal. Its primary partnership is with USAID, implementing projects 
developed by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) or the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center (ADPC) and receiving funding for their own proposals. This 
relationship has been important for effective implementation of a variety of DRM 
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programs in Nepal since NSET’s founding. Overall, NSET is critical of many other 
groups – especially of the “alphabet soup” of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the perceived effectiveness of groups like the Nepal Red Cross 
Society (NRCS). However, I suggest that increased collaboration between NSET and 
NGOs across sectors could offer significant advancement to incorporation of DRM into 
broader society and NSET’s goal of earthquake-safe communities in Nepal. The health 
sector provides an excellent example of how this could be enacted, where sustainable 
health promotion can enhance resiliency and reduce health risks in future disasters. 
Collaboration across sectors would also support incorporation of smart DRM policies 
within broader development goals. Increased networking among NGOs before a future 
disaster, especially while the events of the 2015 earthquakes are still relatively recent in 
institutional memory, would allow the development of policy to avoid the duplication of 
emergency work and successfully reach a broader population of affected people in Nepal. 
 
Organizations working on DRM in Nepal 
Within the field of disaster risk management (DRM) and humanitarian response 
to disasters in Nepal, I’ve identified three key sub-groups of NGOs and international 
agencies.  
 The first of these categories includes a wide variety of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), largely Nepali, with a mission specifically related to disaster risk 
management and/or with ongoing DRM projects established prior to 2015.  The primary 
three are the Nepal Centre for Disaster Management (NCDM), Nepali Red Cross Society 
(NCRS), and the Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal). Though mostly 
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smaller (except NCRS, which also has a wider mission), these organizations are NSET’s 
peers. As a result, many of their projects overlap with issues NSET is also addressing, 
including developing risk reports and management guidelines for other groups in Nepal. 
Following the 2015 earthquakes, many of these groups were and continue to be in an in-
between stage in their work as they regroup, figuring out what worked well and what 
didn’t, how they can support the reconstruction process, and what direction to go with 
future projects. 
 Founded in 1963, the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) has been active under the 
mission to “relieve human suffering and to reduce vulnerability” and works on issues 
including disaster management, health care, community development, and public welfare 
(NRCS – home page). Two main departments work in the field of DRM: the Earthquake 
Response Operation (ERO) and Disaster Management Department. NRCS’s ERO 
program is focused on “integrated recovery,” including “shelter, water sanitation and 
hygiene (WASH), health, livelihood and institutional capacity building (ICB)”. The 
website includes detailed monthly reports from January 2016 through February 2017 that 
clearly document individuals reached and projects implemented, as well as accounts from 
their work in the field (NRCS, “Earthquake Response Organization”). With regards to 
broader DRM programming, NRCS identifies three key areas: Disaster Response (Relief 
and Recovery); Disaster Risk Reduction (Preparedness and Mitigation); and Displaced 
population (people displaced as a consequence of conflict/internal disturbances and 
refugees) (NRCS, “Disaster Management”). Additionally, its focus includes disasters 
more broadly, including fires, floods, and landslides. Like NSET, NRCS emphasizes 
community based disaster risk reduction and capacity building (see NRCS, “CMBDRM 
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Training Manual”), especially since 1997, and have worked to prepare more than 700 
communities (NRCS, “CBDRM Training Manual”:5).  
 The Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal) was founded in 1996, 
three years after NSET, to “strengthen the mechanism of coordination and sharing 
information among organizations and professionals involved in disaster risk management 
in Nepal” (DPNet-Nepal). As an NGO, it is outside the government framework like 
NSET, but envisions a cohesive working group for collaboration between other 
organizations and individuals both domestically and internationally. DPNet-Nepal 
emphasizes resource and information sharing, and works with the Government of Nepal, 
NRCS, the United Nations group on Disaster Preparedness, the European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations, and the Association of International NGOs (AIN) (an 
organization focused on Nepal specifically). Beyond networking, its focus is on 
“mainstreaming DRR” under four priorities that reflect the Sendai Framework for DRR 
(2015-2030): 
• Understanding disaster risk 
• Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk 
• Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience 
• Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back 
Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction”  
(email closure) 
DPNet-Nepal’s leadership board is made up largely of employees at a number of other 
NGOs, who work with the organization on the side. However, since the 2015 
earthquakes, DPNet-Nepal has been largely inactive, as it transitions and reevaluates its 
programming. 
 The Nepal Centre for Disaster Management (NCDM), established in 2002, is a 
group aimed at mitigating the impacts of disasters in Nepal (NCDM, “Home”). NCDM’s 
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guiding principles include protecting livelihood – reinforcing the structural integrity of 
foundations; ensuring safety – providing families and community safe solutions; and 
generating ideas – delivering practical and feasible advice to affected regions. More 
academically focused than many of the other NGOs working on DRM in Nepal, its 
projects have included reports completed in conjunction with UNDP Nepal, the Ministry 
of Physical Planning, and a variety of INGOs (NCDM, “Projects”). Many of these are 
studies on existing government and municipal policies, INGO emergency preparedness 
plans, and national reports. NCDM has worked internationally with the UNDP on select 
projects, including designing safe shelter houses in the Maldives, and led workshops 
training NRCS volunteers and district level technicians. They also emphasize inclusion of 
local communities and capacity building in their vision and mission (NCDM, “Home”). 
While still active, NCDm’s website has not been updated to include projects since 2009, 
though it does include the Nepal Disaster Report from 2015. 
 The second of the three main sub-groups of organizations working in Nepal 
represents NGOs, largely international NGOs, which worked on disaster response for the 
earthquakes. While their missions vary, many of them became involved with relief 
distribution or reconstruction, often centered in communities they were already working 
in. This is commonly extremely short-term work, making them players in DRM for a 
brief period only; however, unlike specifically designated relief organizations, a fourth 
category I do not address in this paper, these NGOs will maintain a continued, albeit 
different, presence in the long-term. While disaster relief is important following an 
earthquake, within the broader field of disaster risk management when organizations only 
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engage with relief, it can seem comparable to a “treat when sick” strategy, which is an 
effective use of resources (Adhikari et al 2016: 2). 
NGOs like these and relief agencies play a prominent role in disaster response. 
Serving as a focal point for international funds, each group has a lot of resources at its 
disposal in the immediate months following the initial earthquakes. Feelings of 
accountability to donors and a desire to be seen as effective often lead these organizations 
to repeat similar showy projects, like rebuilding or donation of supplies, even when these 
projects are superfluous or ineffective uses of funds, as was seen following the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka (see Stirrat 2006). Additionally, because many focus on 
helping communities they know through former projects and NGO work in Nepal is often 
centered in certain areas, this can lead to duplication of activity or uneven support for 
specific communities, like Baruwa. Baruwa, a small village in Dolakha district is located 
on a small trekking route and is home to a well-known monastery. As a result, it has 
developed strong international connections over the years, which have been beneficial in 
earthquake recovery, at least on one scale; as of May 2017, five different NGOs had 
donated money and materials to rebuild the main school – a new building with three 
classrooms, two standalone sets of bathrooms, and the library were all marked with the 
names of different NGOs. 
The final category here is governmental and intergovernmental agencies, 
including USAID, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). USAID is the main United States government 
agency that implements foreign aid and development assistance in the name of the 
American people. Originally founded in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, USAID’s 
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annual budget now runs around 27.2 billion dollars for projects in over 100 countries 
worldwide. In Nepal, programs address a wide range of sectors including education, 
global health, agriculture and food security, and human rights. Disaster risk management 
programs fall under USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) or the 
Disaster Risk Reduction, Reconstruction, and Resilience (DR4) Office. 
UNDP is the global development network under the United Nations. Its projects 
around the world, in 170 countries, pursue the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) 
established in 2012. UNDP have been working in Nepal since 1963 across sectors, 
“supporting the Nepalese people in their struggle against poverty” (UNDP-Nepal). Right 
now, UNDP’s Nepal office is implementing a three-year recovery program, which 
includes reconstruction, livelihood redevelopment, and supporting local governance. The 
office has also recently established an early warning facility for climate-induced disasters 
with Himalayan Consensus (UNDP – “UNDP and Himalayan Consensus…”). 
 JICA is newer and was founded in 2003. It is a Japanese governmental agency 
responsible for coordinating official development assistance (ODA) including technical 
support. Within Nepal, JICA’s past projects have included assistance with construction of 
roads, hydropower plants, and water facilities, establishing national legal frameworks for 
sustainable development, and support of other sectors such as health and education. 
Because of Japan’s own history of earthquakes, JICA has been especially engaged in 
DRM work and Build Back Better programming. 
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NSET’s relationship with other NGOs 
Funding: Partnership with USAID 
 Perhaps NSET’s most significant collaborator over the years has been the Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) branch of USAID. Their relationship has 
changed since 1997, when they first worked together; Amod Dixit describes how NSET 
has shifted from simply implementing USAID proposed projects to actually developing 
and pitching its own proposals to be funded, like with Baliyo Ghar. However, their 
partnership remains primarily based on funding from USAID and USAID’s mission of 
collaboration with local NGOs. 
 USAID has had a long presence in Nepal, beginning its involvement in January of 
1951 and contributing over $1.6 billion in assistance since then. Its mission is to “focus[] 
on supporting Nepal’s democracy and the economic growth needed to eliminate extreme 
poverty, build resilience, and lift the country out of its ‘Least Developed’ status” in 
conjunction with the Government of Nepal (USAID 2017a). The two key offices of 
USAID within the field of disaster risk management are the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) and the Disaster Risk Reduction, Reconstruction, and Resilience 
(DR4) office. Following the 2015 earthquakes, OFDA deployed Disaster Assistance 
Response Teams (DARTs) from Florida to help with search and rescue and to provide 
support for initial evaluations of buildings and needed demolitions. The DR4 office is 
smaller, and in the past has lacked its own discrete funding, operating instead out of 
OFDA; since the earthquake, it has taken on a more direct role in coordinating the 
National Reconstruction Authority and NSET’s Baliyo Ghar. However, over the years, 
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these two offices have been responsible for coordinating many disaster risk reduction 
programming including flood early warning systems in two river basins, community-
based disaster risk management (CBDRM) projects, planting activities to reduce the 
threat of landslides, planning open spaces (with IOM) and the Program for Enhancement 
of Emergency Response (PEER). 
 Partnership with local NGOs remains a key component of USAID’s programming 
generally and specifically in Nepal. To this end, USAID identifies four types of 
organizations: Cooperative Organizations, Foundations, Local and Regional 
Organizations, and U.S. and International Organizations (USAID 2017b). NSET falls 
under the Local and Regional Organizations designation, which has the ultimate goal of 
“strengthen[ing] their capacity, build[ing] effective and long-term partnerships and 
reduc[ing] the need for foreign aid over time” (USAID 2017b). Additionally, with 
regards to its Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) in 2014, USAID 
writes that “U.S. foreign assistance is better secured through stronger Nepali institutions 
and their ability to implement sector programs” (USAID 2017a). In conversations with 
two individuals from the DR4 office, they echoed this, describing how, for DR4, it was at 
times challenging to identify a partner organization in the Nepali Government but that 
there were many important equivalent NGOs, including NSET, working in the field. 
Most programs are developed in conjunction with the Government of Nepal and with 
input from local partners (Andrew Golda, USAID – Interview). In some cases, these 
programs are implemented directly through local partners and initiated by USAID; in 
other cases, the impetus for implementation, perhaps of an earlier program in a new 
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location, comes from the communities themselves, which request the allocation of 
resources towards specific assistance. 
 USAID thinks highly of NSET and regards it as a leader in the field of DRM in 
Nepal, especially around education and technical assistance. Over the years, NSET has 
developed a successful program for teaching masons about building within the building 
code in a seismically-safe manner, as well as partnering with the US Geological Survey. 
When asked about the importance of education, science, and the technical in USAID’s 
DRM programs, Andrew Golda, Acting Office Director of the DR4 Office, said that 
those were the tenets that underpin all of DR4’s work and immediately spoke about 
NSET, describing it as the “scientific leader on earthquake resilience.” NSET has been 
able to test all technical solutions it is proposing, like layering of concrete of wooden 
bands to increase structural stability, informed by seismic engineering and tested on 
shake tables, and this unique level of technical expertise separates NSET from many 
other NGOs that USAID works with in Nepal and internationally (Andrew Golda, 
USAID – Interview). With many of the previous projects implemented by NSET, 
including BCIPN, USAID is waiting for the results about their effectiveness in the last 
earthquake. Anecdotally, many of these programs did make a difference. 
Baliyo Ghar is perhaps unique in its path from development to implementation. 
Andrew Golda described how, after the earthquake, it was “immediately clear that there 
would have to be some program to train masons, [and] raise awareness and support,” and 
that NSET was a natural organization to implement such a program because of its work 
with building code implementation and training of mason before the earthquakes. USAID 
describes looking “at what NSET had done previously, how to tailor that to the specific 
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needs of the earthquake, and then working with the precursor to the NRA on sort of 
designing that and making it align with what the government had in mind in terms of the 
housing subsidy” (Andrew Golda, USAID – Interview). Throughout that process, NSET 
played an active role in developing the program, and considers it to be very much “its” 
program. 
 
Critique of other organizations 
 Outside of USAID, NSET works fairly independently from many of the other 
organizations working on DRM in Nepal. One reason for this may be NSET’s focus on 
preparation before a disaster hits, which sets them apart from some other groups 
responding in 2015. NSET was not a key player in implementing humanitarian response, 
and did not have a huge presence in the field immediately after the earthquake, instead 
continuing its focus on future preparation activities, reconstruction, and utilizing that time 
to evaluate the success of its programs. However, there are also limited examples of 
collaboration with groups in preparedness activities as well, even with groups like NRCS 
who are providing similar community trainings (see Chapter 6).  
Instead, NSET remains somewhat detached and critical of organizations like 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Nepal Red Cross Society 
(NRCS), even when recognizing the work that they are doing. With regards to UNDP, 
Bijay Upadhyay was clear that it was one of the pioneers in championing the 
mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction activities into the development process, one of 
NSET’s key causes now. At the same time, he remarked that to create a UNDP project, 
all I would have to do is take “from A to Z, 26 letters, [and] throw a few letters in place,” 
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and that from this assortment of projects and seemingly meaningless acronyms, it was 
very unclear what UNDP was actually “doing and what they are saying.” I argue that a 
similar critique could also be leveled at NSET and the DRM and development fields 
more broadly, where the vast array of acronyms is nearly impossible to keep straight. 
Additionally, many in the DRM field questioned the effectiveness of the Nepal Red Cross 
Society, suggesting that they were more corrupt, ineffectively utilized funds and 
donations, and lacked the big-scale successful projects of some other organizations. In 
my conversations with individuals from NRCS, they were generally aware of these 
critiques but quick to point to fact sheets and program examples to counter them. 
 
Possibilities for collaboration 
 Collaboration between NGOs, both those focused on DRM and those working 
primarily in other sectors, sets the stage for broader, multi-issue and multi-sector disaster 
preparation, which is both effective and necessary. This can take place through 
incorporation of DRM priorities, approaches, and goals into non-DRM sectors and 
organizations, facilitated with guidance and technical knowledge from NGOs like NSET. 
The health sector provides a prime example of how collaboration can advance the 
objectives of both individual fields - through intentional disaster response, sustainable 
preparation and prevention measures, and long-term community resilience. 
 The importance of the health sector following a major disaster is clear through 
immediate medical response addressing injuries, attempts to prevent outbreaks of disease, 
and support for more general health concerns, like pregnancy, that are significantly 
affected by the disappearance or strain on traditional and typical health care procedures 
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and institutions. This was present in Nepal following the earthquake in 2015, where 
“preventative measures, such as health education, community engagement, and health 
promotion, were promoted” though they “remained largely unimplemented” (Adhikari et 
al 2016:1). Hospitals, like the Chhetrapati Free Clinic, opened their doors to an influx of 
patients, and makeshift facilities emerged in courtyards and open spaces around the 
Kathmandu Valley. 
 Housing and engineering represent a key intersection between health and DRM. 
Research in the health sector on disasters in recent years has shown that “the risk of 
infectious disease outbreaks after disasters are minimal, unless there is a displacement of 
population with poor water and sanitation conditions” (Adhikari et al 2016:1). In this 
case, NSET’s programming, through Baliyo Ghar and building code implementation, 
would pair well with the health work of other NGOs. Individuals, families, and 
communities who have built with earthquake-resilient technologies, or rebuilt following 
the 2015 earthquakes, are thus less vulnerable to displacement or relocation to camps or 
other smaller-scale temporary shelters on their own property. Similarly, earthquake-
resistant building techniques should be applied to hospitals and health posts. The 
Chhetrapati Free Clinic, which is the home base for the Chhetrapati Disaster 
Management Committee (see Chapter 6), has been exploring retrofitting options for their 
existing structure. In Baruwa, a village where NSET is implementing Baliyo Ghar, the 
health post only suffered from minor cracking and was still structurally secure, especially 
because it was only one floor. In both of these cases, the health clinics were able to 
continue to treat people in place. 
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The sustainable prevention (health sector) and preparation (DRM sector) 
measures can occur concurrently, through education and training programs and the 
support of community groups. This has been proven in other disaster environments; for 
example, in Iran “health education and training were found to increase the overall ability 
for… readiness towards disaster situations, such as an earthquake” (Adhikari et al 
2016:2). Health education can also work to increase knowledge about disease prevention, 
hygiene, and other ongoing heath practices, which are crucial both immediately after a 
disaster and in every day practice as well (Adhikari et al 2016:2). 
Both disaster risk management and health-sector projects can also contribute to 
longer-term community resilience. Health programming in Chile promoting calm was 
found to have positively influenced preparedness and built “resilience to cope more 
effectively” with earthquakes and disasters (Adhikari et al 2016:2). Health and education 
and promotion have also been found to lead to “the empowerment of community 
members by increasing health literacy, risk reduction skills, the ability to advocate for 
health-conducive behavior, and community capacity to future disasters” (Adhikari et al 
2016:2). These impacts, both immediate and long-term represent sustainable aspects of 
health education that go beyond the immediate implementation and emerge with forward 
thinking programs. In all of these cases, while implementation individually is possible, 
coordination and combined health-DRM projects would provide a more effective use of 
material and human resources and create a more sustainable framework. 
Collaboration with other NGOs working in different fields and on different issues 
would allow for the implementation of projects, existing and new, in a way that would 
supplement (rather than negate) individual objectives and NSET’s work, and is cognizant 
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of other programs across Nepal. Additionally, collaboration between sectors similar to 
the proposals related to the health sector may be key for engaging some of the NGOs that 
were active immediately following the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal, but which have 
remained mostly independent of the DRM cycle. However, funding would likely remain 
an issue with implementation of similar projects, and organizations would need to work 
within the constraints of grants and donors to market these proposals. 
Collaboration between NGOs in the preparedness phase of disaster risk 
management would allow for a more informed response post-disaster with less 
duplication of emergency work and reconstruction processes. One of the major 
challenges that emerged in the NGO response to the 2015 earthquakes was uneven 
support of communities, where villages with established relationships with NGOs, 
located on popular and well-known trekking routes, or easily accessible from major 
roads, received the vast majority of immediate relief supplies, donations, and 
reconstruction assistance (Spoon 2017). The reasons for this are nuanced as discussed 
earlier in the chapter but can be influenced by the marketability of response spending as a 
component of accountability to the donors and/or a desire to help the people with whom 
the NGO has established personal relationships. Duplication is not always an intended 
decision though; Bijay Upadhyay pointed out that “there are places where multiple 
agencies are working on the same area with the same objectives. Still one institution 
doesn’t know the other or the community that is supported by one institution doesn’t 
know about the community where the other institution is supporting” (Interview). 
Expanding communication before a disaster and having a broader conversation about 
coordination, duplication, and support of similar objectives would allow these issues to 
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be addressed without the immediate pressures of disaster response. Additionally, this 
period after the 2015 earthquakes would prove ideal while institutions can reflect on who 
the other actors in the field were. However, I propose that these discussions should go 
beyond reflection and the hypothetical to actually establishing networks of coordination 
with preparedness activities or other development projects that incorporate DRM as well. 
 A DRM organization, like NSET or the Disaster Preparedness Network (DPNet), 
or the Government of Nepal, could play a key role in coordinating this work on the 
ground as well. Bijay Upadhyay linked the duplication of projects with a lack of 
governmental support, saying that “since it [implementation of projects by different 
agencies] is not linked with the governance system, what happens is, in the same 
community, similar institutions have been going again and again because they are near to 
the vicinity and it is easy to work with” (Interview). Instead, where local management 
committees have been developed and are effective, they have been able to avoid 
duplication by advocating for what they need, in some cases through a clear disaster risk 
management plan that allows them to identify and highlight areas needing support. New 
local government could serve a similar role and NSET’s work with disaster management 
committees could continue to focus on this aspect. However, many communities see any 
project as ultimately more valuable than nothing – Bijay Upadhyay said that people often 
“think that if there is somebody who is going to spend, say, $1000 in our village then 
okay, even if it complicates, there will be some worth more than harm, so let’s accept it” 
(Interview) – and local committees and government have the potential to continue 
perpetuating this approach. 
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Chapter 6 – NSET in the Community 
When the earthquake hit on April 25, 2015, individuals in the town of Panga and 
the Chhetrapati neighborhood, two communities in the Kathmandu Valley, jumped into 
action, putting prearranged plans into play to respond to the disaster in their communities. 
Across Nepal, with or without previous training, people took action, with great success – 
26,000 of those rescued were rescued by quake victims themselves (Bijay Upadhyay – 
Interview). Even with their relative efficiency in some areas, state response was typically 
not seen until day two post-earthquake, and these communities were “thus devoid of 
institutions both in the sense of rule formulating and reproducing sites and in the sense of 
affiliating social agents” (Raj and Gautam 2015:14, 15). In this vacuum, communities 
stepped up to support each other; many authors have written about the cross-difference 
unification they observed in these early days (see McGillis and Spoon 2017). In the two 
years following, divisions may have reappeared but the community has remained a 
central unit in rebuilding and disaster risk management in Nepal. 
This chapter will address NSET’s relationship with the community in Nepal 
through an analysis of both community-based disaster management committees, like 
those in Chhetrapati and Panga, supported by NSET and NSET’s rebuilding program, 
Baliyo Ghar. This analysis will be based on research conducted by Yogesh Raj and 
Bhaskar Gautam, two social science researchers in Nepal; in their preliminary analysis of 
disaster response in the first three months in three communities in the Kathmandu Valley, 
they proposed four fundamental categories that must be considered with regards to 
policies and politics of disaster risk management in Nepal – whether these policies are 
“equitable, socially acceptable, legally permissible, and economically viable options in 
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Nepali society” (2015: 3) In my analysis of NSET’s role in the community, I will 
primarily address questions regarding social acceptability, equitability, and economic 
viability. Legality of programs will briefly be addressed for both community disaster 
management committees and Baliyo Ghar with regards to their relationship to other 
NGOs and the Nepali government, as a component of the sustainability of the programs. 
Following initial descriptions of both projects, I argue that through its social 
mobilizer13 model and as a Nepali NGO, NSET is able to provide culturally sensitive and 
socially acceptable trainings that seek to bridge the gap between its scientific framework 
and the culturally present understandings of risk. In both programs, NSET first seeks to 
develop an understanding of community goals, conceptions of risk, and previous 
exposure to disaster risk management (DRM). From there, social mobilizers, individuals 
with a background in the social sciences or interest in working directly with the 
community, will help to design and implement programming in conjunction with 
community members and the engineers and scientifically-focused goals of NSET. 
I also analyze NSET’s programs in the community with regards to equitability 
and economic viability, the latter through funding sources and sustainable design. 
Training for community-based groups faces great funding constraints that often require 
communities to provide their own funding, while Baliyo Ghar is funded by USAID – this 
impacts which communities NSET is able to work with. However, NSET is realistic 
about these constraints and has successfully sought to navigate its funding sources to 
provide resources to the broadest number of people. Its efforts to promote sustainability 
once it leaves create an environment where community groups have taken responsibility 
                                                
13 During the time that I was conducting research, this position was referred to as the “social mobilizer.” 
Since then, NSET has switched to the term “social development officer” and their current literature has 
been changed to reflect the new terminology. However, this paper will utilize the original term. 
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for sharing information with neighboring areas. However, equitability in programs 
continues to be an underrepresented component of NSET’s implementation.  
 
NSET and Community-led Disaster Risk Management Committees 
 NSET began its work in communities in 1998, when the first ward-level disaster 
management committee was formed in Ward 34. In the process of implementing its 
Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project (KVERMP), which sought to 
address earthquake risk management from multiple directions and included awareness 
raising activities, many communities, including Ward 34, approached NSET seeking 
additional training for their residents. With support from the Jana Shakti Yuva Club and 
under the work of KVERMP, NSET led a five-day training, which ended in the 
establishment of the DMC and a disaster management fund (Pradhanang 2002:136). In a 
paper presented at a 2002 Earthquake Symposium, NSET noted that “the residents of 
these wards have, in their own initiative, taken several actions to try to access and 
decrease the risk of their neighborhoods. The enthusiasm and potential of these groups 
has been exciting” (Pradhanang 2002:136). Since that initial ward, NSET has worked 
with many other communities, especially in the Kathmandu Valley, to help support 
trainings and creation or development of CDMCs and Ward Disaster Response Plans. 
 Much of NSET’s work with communities now falls under the office of Urban 
Disaster Risk Management (UDRM), which is paired with the Geographical Information 
System (GIS) Office and is headed by Bijay K. Upadhyay. The UDRM Office works 
with communities to identify specific disaster risks, including through “conduct[ing] 
hazard assessments & risk mapping, develop[ing] earthquake damage scenarios… and 
  
Shriner 82 
conduct[ing] training and capacity building” (NSET website). There are also specific 
Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) teams, which work with 
individual communities. Due to funding constraints, which will be discussed more later, 
these communities are typically self-selected and approach NSET with their own funding. 
 NSET began work with Chhetrapati, a “core urban settlement” located in 
Kathmandu near the relatively wealthy tourist and trekking area of Thamel, in 2000 or 
2001 (Bijay Upadhyay – Interview). The CDMC there has always operated within the 
walls of the Chhetrapati Free Clinic, a community hospital providing free or affordable 
medical care to the surrounding community. Bijay Mali, the founding and acting 
president of the CDMC, describes part of the motivation for its development was that, as 
a community hospital, the leadership staff felt they needed to be prepared to respond to 
an earthquake – especially when they perceived government preparation as inadequate 
and expected government hospitals to be unable to adequately support their clients. As an 
early leader, Mr. Mali spoke of the derision the CDMC received from the municipal 
government when they first began; the officials they spoke with “all laughed… maybe 
[because] they didn’t think an earthquake would happen in their lifetime, maybe it was 
ignorance.” Prior to the 2015 earthquake, the CDMC in Chhetrapati led trainings, 
especially for women and youth, worked to pre-position stocks, and collaborated with 
other wards14. 
 The CDMC in Panga, a more rural Newari community located on the outskirts of 
Lalitpur (in Ward 9), began a few years later, circa 2002-2005. After receiving initial 
support from the Nepal Red Cross Society, in collaboration with the American Red Cross 
Society, the CDMC developed additional trainings and preparedness plans. Its staff is all 
                                                
14 Pre-positioned supplies can control medical epidemics following a disaster (Adhikari et al 2016:2) 
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volunteers, composed of a wide range of individuals within the community who are 
passionate about the need for preparedness plans. Their backgrounds include a man in his 
40s whose day job is focused on mapping and GIS, while another is a young woman who 
is dedicated to women’s rights and had an interest in counseling and psychiatry. Recently 
the woman completed training in India and is leading counseling clinics post-earthquake 
in the community. Overall, members of the Panga CDMC are younger than those of the 
Chhetrapati CDMC. The Panga CDMC also worked to pre-position stocks and enhance 
members capacity through trainings prior to the 2015 earthquakes. Specific women’s 
groups developed to create and sell Go Bags, and the CDMC has been active in 
community support for trauma and rebuilding. 
 From the beginning of its work in a community, NSET emphasizes awareness 
building and general preparedness training, and can also support the implementation of 
other training programs or the development of a disaster management plan from its own 
hazard assessments. While communities typically approach NSET, either because an 
individual has attended another of NSET’s awareness trainings or they have heard of the 
work other communities are doing and want to replicate it, Bijay Upadhyay observed that 
when NSET first started working with groups, it was very difficult to convince 
community members that preparing for disasters, especially unpredictable earthquakes, 
could be effective. However, over time, with the implementation of more programs, and 
awareness of other disasters abroad like the 2001 Gujarat earthquake or the 2005 Pakistan 
earthquake, the leaders of the CDMCs came to further support the program’s importance 
and were able to convince others in their communities to develop their own community 
information systems and preparedness plans. 
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Community groups, through partnerships with NGOs, like NSET or the Nepal 
Red Cross Society, can build their capacity for disaster risk management. NSET in 
particular has focused extensively on this, working to build the community knowledge 
base. As Bijay Upadhyay describes, the first step when NSET begins to work with a new 
community (either identified by NSET for a program or a group that has approached 
NSET for trainings) is to complete risk perception surveys. These surveys are then used 
as a base to start the process of education and preparation using the community’s 
“language.” This language represents the community’s base level understanding of the 
science behind earthquakes and what steps they need to take to prepare. By starting at this 
level, NSET believes it is more successful in engaging individuals and the community. 
Additionally, this attitudinal change, away from more typical or historical understandings 
of disasters as deity-sent, is key for community level work, especially with individuals 
outside of DRM work. Through all its lessons, NSET strives to make the topic more 
accessible, utilizing hands-on-learning tools like model shake tables, to increase the 
understanding of the need for preparation. 
Beyond the level of education (both science-based and basic preparation), NGOs 
can also provide community groups like the Chhetrapati and Panga CDMCs with training 
for first aid, search and rescue, and more. In conjunction with NSET and organizations 
like the Nepal Red Cross Society, these communities held search and rescue, and first aid 
training programs, as well as a number of earthquake simulations that provided a realistic 
experience of what an earthquake in their community would be like. Because of NGOs’ 
large backing and connections, these training programs in Panga were able to include 
local emergency response vehicles and involve a large section of the community. 
  
Shriner 85 
During the 2015 earthquakes, these community disaster management committees 
responded both within their community and beyond, pulling together all of their training 
and preparation. Sonia Awale writes that there was “delayed, inappropriate, or ineffective 
rescue and relief” (Awale 2017). However, these first hours and days represent one of the 
most critical times in disaster response and are key to providing initial assistance to 
affected communities. In this environment, Ward 17 CDMC, like many others, jumped 
into action, helping with rescues, bringing wounded to be treated at their adjacent 
hospital, and organizing shelters for survivors (Awale 2017; Bijay Mali – Interview). 
Community-based search and rescue teams trained by the Chhetrapati CDMC rescued 
two people following the 2015 earthquakes. These teams were able to utilize previously 
stored supplies, including jacks to prop up collapsed buildings for safe rescue or body 
retrieval, and long pipes for delivering food and water to trapped people. These teams 
were also able to respond outside of their ward and in many cases (for example when a 
temple collapsed on people donating blood outside of their ward) they were able to 
respond before the government, army, or police were able to. While their first priority 
was the local area, they were able to reach out and help others, especially because 
Chhetrapati was not hit as heavily. 
With training and support, the CDMC can be the best level at which to address 
issues of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the months and years following a 
disaster. Established community disaster management groups are well-positioned to 
provide continued response within a community following a disaster, and following the 
initial NGO and governmental response, while NGOs often face limited time frames. As 
community members, individuals in a CDMC group will also be more aware of 
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challenges facing their neighbors. For example, community leaders working on women’s 
issues in Panga, through visits to temporary living shelters and conversations with other 
women, discovered that there was a growing issue with PTSD and emotional processing 
following the disaster. One of these women then completed a multi-month training 
program in India and has led the psychosocial response of the Panga CDMC, including 
various counseling programs, and programs addressing sleep disorders and insomnia. 
Community groups like CDMCs are also well-positioned to work with existing 
organizations within the community to expand outreach following the earthquake, 
especially for mental health services. One of the Panga CDMC’s projects was a 
children’s library at the local school, which served as the central point for programs on 
helping children cope with and process the disaster. Chhetrapati also built on the existing 
framework of the CFC to provide mental health and counseling sessions for the staff at 
the medical center because “a lot of them were pretty shaken up.” In this later example, 
the broader Chhetrapati CDMC and Free Clinic collaboration provided needed support 
for those responding to the disaster on the ground, encouraging broader community 
resilience. 
 
NSET’s Baliyo Ghar program (2015-2020) 
Baliyo Ghar 
         NSET’s main current program is Baliyo Ghar, a five-year program (October 2015 
to September 2020) focused on rebuilding homes damaged or destroyed by the 2015 
earthquakes in a disaster-resilient manner. Officially, it is described as a “Cooperative 
Agreement for Housing Reconstruction Technical Assistance” and is being implemented 
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in Kathmandu, Dolakha, Dhading, and Nuwakot, four of the fourteen most earthquake-
affected districts (NSET, “Baliyo Ghar”). The program’s focus represents both an 
expansion of NSET’s construction work before the earthquake (through BCIPN and 
related programs) and an increasing recognition of the critical importance of earthquake-
resistant building techniques. Of the over 9000 people killed in the 2015 earthquakes, 
over 98 percent were killed as buildings collapsed, and the destruction of buildings also 
represents a loss of assets, money, and time. These two aspects combined led Amod Dixit 
to describe houses as the main source of risk in an earthquake and building a strong house 
as the most important way to prepare physically for future events (Kathmandu NSET – 
Interview). Additionally, as 90 percent of building in Nepal is completed or led by the 
house owners themselves, Baliyo Ghar is focused on training “common people” and 
masons in the communities, rather than exclusively focusing on policy implementation 
(Kathmandu NSET – Interview; NSET, “Baliyo Ghar”). This is especially relevant in the 
post-earthquake situation in Nepal, where, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
“more than 31,000 earthquake survivors in 11 of the 14 worst affected districts have 
rebuilt their homes on their own” because government programming and assistance was 
too long delayed in coming (Anderson and Baruah 2016). 
         In an effort to reach beyond main population centers to more remote towns, the 
Baliyo Ghar program operates on central, district, and local levels, through 
Reconstruction Technology Centers (RTCs) and Mobile Teams. A total of seven RTCs, 
including one in Kathmandu, are designed to coordinate training and technical support 
teams (NSET, “Baliyo Ghar”). The Local Reconstruction Technology Center (LRTC) in 
Singati served as an information hub, answering questions and providing resource 
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materials to people who came to the office including women, children, homeowners, and 
trained masons. At any given time when I stopped by the office, there were usually two to 
three technical engineers or social mobilizers working there and available to answer any 
questions about Baliyo Ghar, specifics of the construction process, or disaster preparation 
broadly. Furthermore, in addition to leading its own training programs, the LRTC was 
responsible for the accounts and administration of groups in six VDCs, via site visits and 
monthly reports submitted by the mobile teams. 
         These mobile teams work to provide outreach to remote communities often 
overlooked by other Build Back Better programs. Each team consists of a technical 
engineer, a social mobilizer, and a lead mason (often from the community itself). The 
technical engineer and social mobilizer work together to provide orientations, encourage 
participation, and teach earthquake resilient building techniques. The project begins with 
community outreach efforts and initial surveys on disaster risk perception, before shifting 
to training programs and supporting work on construction sites. Especially in the village 
setting, most masons learn their trade on the job from their seniors and NSET’s program 
seeks to implement training that works within this setting by including both on-the-job 
and classroom training (Kathmandu NSET – Interview). The social mobilizer is a key 
component of all of these stages – helping to bridge the gap between the local community 
and often-inaccessible language of engineering. They are also responsible for sharing 
ideas and systems like the parma system of shared labor and encouraging communities to 
adopt these practices for more effective and faster re-building (Social Mobilizer, Singati 
NSET – Interview). 
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 Early reports indicate successful implementation of the Baliyo Ghar program. In 
the first year of the program (through December 2016), more than 3,800 masons were 
trained and over 2,500 houses were built. Through these trainings and the nine 
Reconstruction Resource Centers, over 38,000 people have been reached and informed 
about the importance and methods of disaster-resilient reconstruction (USAID, “Baliyo 
Ghar”). 
 
Implementation in Baruwa, Dolakha District 
         My main field site for my research on Baliyo Ghar was Baruwa, a town in the 
Dolakha District, about a five- to seven- hour walk or two-hour drive from Singati. It is 
located south of China and Tibet, to the east of Sindhupalchok, to the west of 
Gaurishankar Himaal, and to the north of the Kalinchowk temple. This physical location 
as a sense of place was emphasized in my interviews with the village teachers. The 
village itself is decentralized, consisting of about 600 houses spread within a two-hour 
walk of each other across both sides of a river valley. There are four schools – two 
government primary schools, one government secondary school (through class ten), and 
one English-medium private school. The town is 70 percent Sherpa, 10 percent Magar, 10 
percent Newari and 10 percent other castes and groups, including Brahmin-Chhetri, 
Tamang, Tami, and Gurung. While families often speak their mother tongue with each 
other, Nepali is the main language of communication in schools, stores, and training 
programs like those of Baliyo Ghar. Like many towns in Nepal, remittances form an 
increasingly important component of the local economy and the teachers I talked with 
estimated that many households had two or three people working abroad, everywhere 
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from the Dubai to Korea, Malaysia to the United States. The 2015 earthquakes caused 
significant damage – all but a dozen houses collapsed in the April 25th earthquake and 
landslides from the May 12th aftershock wiped out temporary shelters, fields, and the 
road. However, the timing of the initial earthquake was described as a “blessing” since it 
was a Saturday and “students were at their own houses, were outside. If it had been a 
Sunday, maybe many would have died” compared to the four deaths that did occur 
(Baruwa Secondary School – Interview). 
         Within the community two main members of the NSET team, the technical 
engineer and the social mobilizer, work with a local lead mason. The social mobilizer has 
worked there for about a year, the duration of the program’s time in Baruwa15. He 
completed his Bachelor’s and Master’s in English and, before starting his job with NSET, 
worked for four years at a children’s rights INGO in Nepal. After a two to three month 
gap with no engineer, the current technical engineer began work there three months ago. 
His educational background is in civil engineering and he studied in Kathmandu. From 
conversations with other teams, I learned that the Baruwa team’s backgrounds are fairly 
similar to those in other towns with social mobilizers often having backgrounds in social 
sciences and engineers completing their higher education in Kathmandu, often finishing 
school within the last few years. Many of the technical engineers and social mobilizers 
also expressed a desire to stay in their own country to help with the rebuilding efforts as 
one of the main reasons they applied for the Baliyo Ghar job. 
         The program, as implemented in Baruwa, followed the same general plan that I 
described in the general Baliyo Ghar design. When the program first started in the 
community, the social mobilizer completed an initial risk perception survey, which also 
                                                
15 The program in this VDC was not part of the initial programs implemented beginning in October 2015. 
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addressed questions about how much community members knew about earthquakes 
(Baruwa NSET – Interview). Additionally, two “how to build [earthquake resistant]” 
training programs have been held so far. One of them was a seven-day “for skill 
development” for trained masons. The other was a 50-day program held for “new people” 
or individuals who had not received previous formal or informal training.  
Especially in the latter, NSET’s training model followed traditional learning 
methods by implementing “on the job” training where the new masons worked together 
to build a house in the village. For both training programs, those attending received 300 
Rs/day (about $3) to cover transportation and food expenses, as well as five basic tools 
that they were allowed to keep at the end. The other materials were also provided free of 
cost by NSET. Going forward, the technical engineer expects there to be other trainings, 
especially another 50-day training, “per the requirement”. When asked when that might 
occur, he told me, “I believe that we will have to give another soon.” 
   Currently the main component of NSET’s work in Baruwa is what is often 
referred to as the “mobile clinic,” which is the day-to-day monitoring and house visits 
completed by both the technical engineer and social mobilizer. While staying in the 
village, I had the opportunity to walk around to five construction sites with the technical 
engineer and observe his interactions with people building houses. He is very well known 
and seems highly regarded – when arriving at a new site, he was immediately brought 
into the conversations and jokes, and served as a reference point on a variety of questions 
about ideas, plans, and measurements. At the sites, the technical engineer typically did 
not provide immediate feedback unless directly asked, though he encouraged people to 
ask him if they had questions or concerns. Overall, he was seen as a supporting person in 
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the construction process – one house owner described how all of the people helping build 
his house were “house building people,” but that he also was able to clarify or confirm 
that his house would be surakshit (safe) by checking with the “do this do that” man (the 
technical engineer). Additionally, I often observed the social mobilizer also making 
rounds around the village, sitting in on kaajaa (the mid-day meal or snack) in a café, 
chatting with the teachers during a break, or visiting with community members on the 
side of the road. 
   Overall, people working on the construction sites and house owners seemed very 
well informed about earthquake resistant (“bhukampa pratirodi”) building techniques. 
Key components included the use of bands (pethi) and ties, stronger foundations (jag), 
and lighter roofing material (see Appendix A for illustrated examples). NSET provided 
training and models for two different kinds of houses utilizing these baliyo ghar 
techniques – Reinforced Cement Concrete (RCC) or more traditional wood and stone. 
One of the most important components of a stronger house is the use of horizontal and 
vertical bands throughout, which are then secured to themselves in what are called “ties”. 
Before the earthquake, most, if not all, of the houses lacked these supports. Additionally, 
foundations should be laid and include deeper posts that stabilize the house. Lastly, 
roofing material should be made of tin sheets well secured against wind, rather than the 
heavier stone slabs that were the traditional roofing material. I found that people were 
very enthusiastic to show me how they were building their house to be earthquake-
resistant and their understanding was generally very consistent with the models provided 
by NSET and my conversations with NSET technical engineers. 
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   The biggest concern raised by house owners, teachers, and other individuals in 
Baruwa was the discrepancy between the size of their old houses and that of the model 
houses provided by the NRA and NSET. Overall, Build Back Better programs encourage 
the building of smaller houses, which conflicts with residents’ interests and needs. When 
asked about the size of the house they were building, people most often told me they 
were building a one-story house because “small houses are good, safe.” However, before 
the earthquake, many houses were two or three stories, and rooms were often rented out 
in a homestay program for trekkers and visitors from around the world. The teachers at 
the school were more candid about their concerns with the change, pointing out that 
hosting these visitors was important as a needed source of income and to build 
relationships for donations to the town. The NSET team also mentioned the size 
discrepancy as a challenge they faced, because they are the ones on the ground who must 
ultimately reconcile the government’s standards for certification, earthquake resistant 
building requirements, and the villagers’ own desires. 
 
Encouraging awareness and acceptance through the Social Mobilizer 
 Education is key for disaster risk management and addressing people’s 
perceptions of risk and need for action, especially in countries like Nepal where many 
people believe or understand natural disasters to be acts of God. This belief is 
institutionalized at the national level with natural disaster acts using the Nepali phrase 
“daiwik prakop,” which translates literally to “deity calamity” or “deity disaster” (CEO 
of the NRA –Interview, Bijay Upadhyay – Interview). Since I completed my research 
following the orientations in Baruwa and with existing CDMCs in Panga and 
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Chhetrapati, it was difficult to explore the underlying and previously held beliefs behind 
what caused the earthquakes, though it did come up in some conversations. For example, 
in my interview with the Baruwa ward chairperson he told me that those who died in the 
village were sinners and that the earthquake was an act of God to punish them. In this 
kind of environment, belief has been identified as one of the main four limiting factors 
for risk reduction action. Disaster management courses have the potential to “convince 
[participants] that natural disasters are not acts of God, and that preventative measures 
could help to reduce their impact” (Chhetri 2001:69-70, Douglas 1975:236). Even in 
programs focused on reconstruction, like the Baliyo Ghar program, it is critical to build 
awareness about both the science behind earthquakes and additional opportunities for 
disaster risk reduction. Through programs built on a community’s existing knowledge, a 
social mobilizer model to bridge the gap between the technical and local, and trainings 
focused on key social groups, NSET effectively engages diverse communities in disaster 
risk management. 
 When entering a new community, NSET emphasizes collaboration with the 
community and seeks to first establish what the community is like and where they are 
with disaster risk management. Though it depends somewhat on funds, NSET employees 
first complete a risk perception baseline survey to understand people’s level of risk 
perception. Even in instances where they cannot complete a full survey, they first “try to 
observe the community through the community members eyes” because “if [NSET] 
observe[s] the community through [their] eyes, then it is all rubbish” (Bijay Upadhyay – 
Interview). Expanding on this idea, Mr. Upadhyay explained that it was key to also 
explore community dynamics, social mechanism, major problems, and more, and not 
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doing so would be detrimental to the success of NSET’s program. From there, when 
working with CDMCs or communities who have approached them for trainings (as 
opposed to Baliyo Ghar communities), NSET first shares its limitations, works to 
establish the community’s limitations, and then develops a joint communication about the 
objectives of the project. Mr. Upadhyay shared that this works to build a relationship with 
the community based on mutual understanding, which supports facilitation of disaster 
risk management programs, and acknowledged that at times this means that NSET has to 
change its initial objectives if they’re found to be incompatible with the community or the 
community’s objectives.  
 From these initial conversations with the community, NSET seeks to develop and 
implement programs utilizing the community’s risk perception and understanding, and 
that elevate traditional sources of disaster knowledge. Traditional building techniques in 
Nepal, utilizing wood framing or bricks, were often earthquake resistant due to the 
historical occurrence of frequent (on the timescale of 80 years) quakes. Exposure to 
European building techniques, through cultural transmission from the elites who visited 
England and engineering training programs based in a British school of thought, caused a 
dramatic shift away from these techniques and traditions to new building technologies 
that did not reflect the seismicity of the region. Bijay Upadhyay began his career with the 
renovation or reconstruction of traditional Nepali buildings and monuments in Bhaktapur, 
where he became familiar with the earthquake-resistant nature of traditional construction 
technology. Following work on the National Building Code in the early 1990s and his 
subsequent career in NSET, he sought to include this knowledge in all building policies.  
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This traditional knowledge also extends beyond engineering to non-structural and 
behavioral elements, which were ritualized into culture. Across Nepal, traditional sayings 
promoted a message of “don’t panic, stay where you are,” which captures much of the 
basic tenets of earthquake safety. These sayings, as translated to English and shared by 
Bijay Upadhay, include:  
• “If you grab the main post (that is the central post of a building), and then shout 
mine, mine, the earthquake will think this poor guy, I’ll let it go, I’ll not damage 
that building” 
• “When there is an earthquake, you grab the dust that falls from top [above you] 
without letting it touch the ground and put it in a pendant” 
• “Just scratch the floor and then throw it out” 
Bijay Upadhyay will often open a presentation with these messages, or ask community 
members to bring up their own, and then ask them to look at the common message. The 
people he talks to, he says, are quick to dismiss earthquake advice as sayings brought 
from American and Japan that are not suitable for Nepal, or to laugh at the old sayings; 
however, when combined in conversation with other disaster risk management policies, 
they become powerful tools of sharing knowledge because of their cultural roots in 
Nepal. 
The social mobilizer model is also a key component of all NSET community-
based programs. The Urban Disaster Risk Management (UDRM) office at NSET, which 
facilitates many of the trainings for community disaster committees, employs a social 
mobilizer, as does each Baliyo Ghar community. Bijay Upadhyay shared a story about 
how, at the first orientation with all new engineers recruited for NSET’s programs, he 
tells them “to start forgetting [their] engineering and start learning sociology” and 
likewise tells social mobilizers to “forget your social mobilizer part, become now an 
engineer.” This cross-disciplinary approach strengthens the team and improves 
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implementation in the community. It also is a key focus for an organization like NSET, 
which is largely a technical organization, founded by engineers with an emphasis on 
scientific research.  
Bijay Upadhyay himself exemplifies this attempt to bridge the gap between the 
social science and community-level, and technical aspects; trained as an engineer, he is 
extremely personable and has spent years working to communicate with communities at 
their own level. His success is clear – leaders of the Panga CDMC thought highly of Mr. 
Upadhyay. Though Mr. Upadhyay was quick to dismiss his own popularity in the 
community during our interview, saying what matters most was whether the communities 
were prepared, not what they thought of him personally, I argue that these two are 
intrinsically connected and that having an engaging, personable, and accessible leader is 
critical for successful communication of risk and preparedness.  
NSET’s community programs typically include an orientation or basic training 
program, building basic earthquake knowledge and utilizing accessible learning materials 
like shake tables or videos. The Baliyo Ghar program includes an initial orientation, 
coupled with general awareness building. The approximately two-hour orientation is held 
for all community members and provides a basic knowledge about earthquakes, 
earthquake resistant building techniques, and broader earthquake preparedness (Baliyo 
Ghar Orientation Video). NSET recognizes the limitations of literacy in Baliyo Ghar 
meetings and lectures, especially in a rural VDC setting, and these programs are based on 
videos and visual presentations, rather than pamphlets.  
Additionally, the NSET team and teachers at the school informed me that they 
also passed out some pamphlets, useful for individuals who were unable to attend the 
  
Shriner 98 
meeting and to provide materials for future reference. The potential effectiveness of this 
in the VDC setting was illustrated by a poster fighting against the occurrence of human 
trafficking after the earthquakes and hung in the kaajaa stand near the secondary school. 
The shop was highly frequented for a snack during or after school by one of the target 
groups, children, and the poster’s catchy graphics likely caught many of their eyes. 
However, when I spoke with individuals at a number of construction sites, the ward 
chairperson, and women in the fields, no one else seemed to know about these materials 
and the most common response was “the government/the NGOs did not give us 
pamphlets”.  
Overall, it was hard to fully evaluate the impact of the orientation program, 
especially without the pre-program baseline, but its true effectiveness seemed unclear. I 
found that there was consistent general knowledge about the basic ideas of plate tectonics 
and the typical 80-year window between major earthquakes but a general lack of 
responses regarding opportunities for earthquake preparedness outside of building a 
baliyo ghar, such as creating a “go bag” (jatpat jholaa), not running during the shaking, 
and identifying safe spaces both inside and outside. 
Once initial volunteers are trained, Community Disaster Management Committees 
(CDMCs) have the capacity to train other community members, thus reaching a much 
broader audience than the NGOs would have been able to on their own. To-date, the 
Chhetrapati CDMC has trained over 600 members. These classes are free and they’ve 
been able to provide snacks and meals, making the trainings accessible and incentivized. 
Similar skill sharing can also occur through the Baliyo Ghar program, where newly-
trained masons work with others to build houses within their community and other 
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nearby communities, and in the process informally disseminate earthquake-resistant 
building techniques. 
These initial orientations and additional training programs, held by both NSET 
and CDMCs can also focus on specific subsections of the community allowing for 
coverage of specific topics or wider dissemination of their message. For example, it is 
important for education programs to reach out to leaders in the community, such as 
teachers and the new local government officials. From my conversations with four 
teachers at the secondary school in the town of Baruwa, I learned that NSET’s program 
has already effectively been implemented through them. One teacher told me that “before 
even we did not know what to do but now we’ve learned from NGOs and the government 
and we teach our students what to do in our classrooms.” While not targeted specifically 
by NSET’s awareness programs, they were also able to attend the orientation and, with 
the newly learned information, can reinforce the lessons in their own classrooms. Queries 
into the kinds of lessons they taught included “don’t panic” or “don’t be nervous,” “don’t 
run,” and “you have to go to an open area” – key components of earthquake safety. 
Additionally, the social mobilizer often spent time in the main office with the teachers 
who had time off, creating a space for informal conversations about earthquakes and 
earthquake preparation education. 
The Chhetrapati CDMC has also promoted trainings for housewives, who Bijay 
Mali describes as “the most efficient people to train to reach the community” because of 
their role within the family environment. In fact, many of these trainings focused 
specifically on family preparedness – what to include in an emergency container, how to 
develop a family disaster plan, and what steps to take within the house to increase one’s 
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security in the case of an earthquake. This corresponds with Bijay Mali’s priorities, as he 
told me that the most important earthquake preparation was done at the household level – 
that every house must be prepared, to have a bag of easily accessible and grabbable 
medical supplies, water and food. This food must also be “ready-made khaana” – food 
that does not require cooking – like chiura instead of uncooked rice. It also must be 
culturally acceptable, which is a mistake that Bijay Mali said that outside NGOs often 
make in their promotional materials and implementation. With broad implementation, 
this “family first” approach has the ability to allow communities to provide for 
themselves in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and corresponds well to actual 
responses on the ground. Following the 2015 earthquakes, damage in the outskirts of the 
Kathmandu Valley was often uneven, with some families’ homes faring significantly 
better than others. In these cases, households opened up floor space or makeshift tent 
space to neighbors and relatives, often for weeks after. In specific cases, like Bijay Mali’s 
own family, he was able to support a number of other households with his personal stored 
medical and food supplies.  
Another key population for Chhetrapati is high school students who are old 
enough to share what they learn back home (thereby reaching even more people) and are 
typically very physically able for search and rescue. These trainings consist of two 
components, much like the trainings NSET provides. The first step is to supplement any 
education they may have received in school, teaching them the scientific explanation for 
earthquakes and the history of past earthquakes in Nepal, like the one in 1934. The 
second step consists of much more hand-on trainings, with individuals learning to belay 
from balconies (both individually and carrying “injured” people as well), working 
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together as a team to respond to a hypothetical earthquake, and practicing first aid on 
each other. These trainings work to recognize potential limitations in materials and 
supplies, with teens learning how to create makeshift litters and stretchers from blankets 
or bamboo poles and jackets. Trainings like the more extensive ones for youth and teens 
are often held with assistance from mountain rescue teams or individual volunteers from 
other organizations who may, for example, be first aid certified. The first aid trainings are 
typically three days. 
Awareness efforts also need to be designed with a special focus on children in the 
community because of their vulnerability, the importance of the topic in their lives, and 
their ability to serve as information conduits. Overall, children are especially at risk in the 
event of natural disasters, which can be seen in Baruwa where two of the four deaths in 
the 2015 earthquakes were students at the secondary school (Mitchell, et al 2008:255; 
Baruwa Secondary School – Interview). They are also more likely to be receptive to the 
information included in trainings, as they are more trusting of information sources, less 
firmly set on cultural beliefs like earthquakes as divine punishment, and more likely to 
have had initial education on earthquakes because of their higher rates of literacy 
(Mitchell, et al 2008:259).  
Furthermore, earthquakes and earthquake preparedness are especially relevant 
topics to them. When I asked the teachers in Baruwa if they thought their students would 
know what to do in the event of another earthquake, the answer was yes – because of 
their lessons in the classroom, the fact that they had experienced so many earthquakes 
over the last two years (the initial quake and aftershocks), and their interest in learning 
about the topic after two of their classmates were killed. Baruwa presented a good 
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environment for the inclusion of a student-focused awareness and preparedness program 
because of their emphasis on education, but youth are a critical sector of the population 
even, or especially, where formal schooling is lacking.  
Beyond their own knowledge, children are also an important resource for 
communicating disaster risk within their communities. Because of their established 
relationships with family, friends, and neighbors, children are able to “convey messages 
with meaning” that are both more likely to resonate with people and will be “continually 
re-affirmed, whereas external messages rely on small windows of opportunity to convey 
information and influence community members” (Mitchell, et al 2008:259). Due to the 
constraints of my study and my position as an undergraduate researcher I was unable to 
interview children directly about their knowledge of the possibility of a future 
earthquake. However, through my conversations with teachers in Baruwa, children 
seemed well informed and student-led education programs could be effectively 
implemented. Similar events have already occurred; a few months ago, a sanitation march 
led by children of the English-medium private school sought to mobilize the community 
around the importance of adequate sanitation for health. A similar undertaking for 
earthquake preparedness could be an effective tactic for education of all sectors of the 
population. However, overall, I found that youth, especially below high school age, were 
not included in CDMC trainings or programs, which is a major fault in their 
effectiveness. 
It is also important to recognize the constraints of education on its own, without 
cultural and community-relevance or not paired with other components of disaster 
preparation. As Douglas puts it, “one cannot simply impose their own scientific approach 
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or moral knowledge on others without recognizing existing backgrounds and beliefs” 
(Douglas 1975:242). The Baliyo Ghar program and NSET training programs, 
implemented at the beginning of community trainings do seek to address this to some 
extent with the use of social mobilizers to bridge the gap between the technical and 
jargon-filled language of disaster risk management and the local community. However, 
there are still many examples where individuals know what to do but, based on their own 
experiences in the past earthquake and previously held beliefs, they ultimately plan to 
disregard these lessons. One young man in Baruwa expressed skepticism about the 
strength of the new houses (saying “even iron rods bent in the [2015] earthquake”) and 
told me that making go bags for emergency use will “only make people nervous.” 
Additionally, many community members and individuals in Kathmandu talked about how 
“in an earthquake, running is the best thing [to do]” because there’s no way to survive 
standing in a doorway or crouching under a table if the entire house collapses on top of 
you. Community programs should seek to also acknowledge these beliefs and 
experiences from the past earthquake, and work with people to develop new knowledge – 
CDMCs can help to bridge this gap and reach the community in relevant and culturally-
sensitive ways. 
 
Funding 
One of the main challenges for NSET’s work in the community is the constraint 
of inconsistent funding. However, this challenge affects programs with CDMCs and the 
Baliyo Ghar program very differently, especially in determining which communities 
NSET works with.  
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While leaders at NSET like Bijay Upadhyay express continued support and belief 
in the importance of CBDRM, NSET is unable to actively seek out communities or meet 
the needs of all communities that express interest in collaboration. Bijay Upadhyay 
recognizes the constraints of this model, where NSET is simply unable to work with 
many communities because the funding is not available. Within the constraint of its 
funding, NSET seeks to support communities as much as it is able, typically waiving all 
training fees for local groups and supplementing with its own funds received through 
international trainings, which are paid for (see Chapter 4). However, communities must 
typically provide some initial funding, through grants or fellowships, in conjunction with 
NSET’s funding. In the case of Ward 34, this came as minimal financial support from 
NSET from 2000-2002 (with a possible extension) and a fellowship through the World 
Seismic Safety Initiative (WSSI) (Pradhanang 2002:136, 137), while Panga received 
initial support from the Red Cross Society.  
One of the major challenges facing CDMCs in initial disaster response is their 
limited or non-existent capacity for rescuing within collapsed concrete structures. As 
many households rebuild with concrete structures, following popular belief that concrete 
structures will be more secure than traditional brick or stone, nearly all CDMCs remain 
underprepared for earthquake response, like the rest of Nepal, without the resources to 
rescue within collapsed structures. These supplies include, at the basic level, concrete 
cutters, infrared heat detectors, and cranes or heavy lifters. At the moment, Nepal only 
has a set of demonstration tools for concrete rescue but in addition to army, police, and 
armed police, every ward would need these resources prepositioned (Kunda Dixit – 
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Interview). However, without significant outside funding for purchase and training, a 
ward disaster committee lacks the resources for this. 
Unlike many of the financial constraints of NSET’s work with individual 
community groups, the Baliyo Ghar program is fully funded with the assistance of 
USAID. Because of NSET’s long-standing work in the Disaster Risk Management field 
and previous work with USAID (for example on the Building Code Implementation 
Program in Nepal (BCIPN)), NSET was able to develop a proposal for its rebuilding 
project and propose it to the agency for funding, allowing NSET to maintain control over 
its program and implementation. The security of a five-year grant means NSET has been 
able develop and expand its program on the ground, allowing it to reach communities that 
may not have already been engaged in DRM work or with lower levels of initial 
awareness. Funding is thus inherently tied to questions of equity within programs, which 
I will expand on in the next section. 
 
Equity 
Equitability of disaster risk management in Nepal depends significantly on 
understandings of caste distinctions and discrimination. I have touched briefly on issues 
of caste with regards to development of community programs and the implementation of 
the Baliyo Ghar program. However, even within a relatively caste-homogenous 
community, there can be significant divisions by class, gender, and more. Because of my 
fieldwork focused on NSET and disaster risk management committees, and NSET’s 
design and implementation of programs, rather than community response, these aspects 
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will not be deeply addressed in this thesis16. However, issues of equity can also come into 
play with institutional understandings of social divisions and accessibility of the 
programs to diverse individuals on the ground. Issues of equitability are especially 
relevant for aid post-disaster, where daily social divisions are exacerbated. Attempts at 
equal distribution can actually further inequalities, especially where a disaster has hit 
different communities or areas differently.  
While NSET promotes an institutional understanding of issues of equity, I found a 
limited understanding among the staff of some of the nuances of discrimination and how 
this influences people’s experience both of disaster risk management or rebuilding 
programs and of a disaster. Bijay Upadhyay briefly mentioned that there is some problem 
supporting underprivileged or single household people and while the community is 
typically able to support those individuals, “there are still problems where even the 
community is not able to take care of those” people. In those instances, NSET does 
implement trainings to “make some special arrangements for these people who really 
can’t do anything” (Bijay Upadhyay – Interview). Mr. Upadhyay also appeared to 
downplay caste discrimination within communities, redirecting a question about it to 
clashes more broadly, saying “you can’t always really say it’s caste. It could be a 
difference of opinion.” These conflicts, he stated, can typically be successfully mediated 
by community facilitators, or, if that does not work, resolved using legal means. NSET’s 
relationship as a supporting partner with CDMCs may play a role in its lack of 
development of specific policies to support underrepresented and marginalized groups in 
the community. 
                                                
16 For additional perspectives on conceptions of community in Nepal, see Pigg (1993) and for the role of 
the Dalit populations in earthquake response, see Folmer (2015) and Barron (2017).  
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As implemented in a relatively homogenous community like Baruwa, NSET’s 
Baliyo Ghar program still makes a directed effort to reach all households in the 
community. However, there are a number of constraints when building a house, including 
lack of financial, human, and material resources. Building a new house is an expensive 
proposition and, even two years after the 2015 earthquakes, the ward chairperson 
estimated that 75 percent of Baruwa’s residents still do not have the resources to rebuild 
and “only rich people can build a new house.” Throughout my interviews, lack of funds 
was the single most cited reason for not building a house or not building a house until 
now. One older woman spoke of the hardships of living in a temporary shelter and said 
that she hoped to build a house soon, but that it was unlikely because her husband was 
unable to provide the labor and her only son was working to build his own house with his 
very limited income. Another family currently working to rebuild had been forced to 
downsize from their original plans to a two-room house because they ran out of sufficient 
funds to build larger. The expense of rebuilding inevitably came up in many other 
informal conversations, usually presented as a limiting factor for the work that they had 
or had not done, or because of the hardship it had been for their family. 
         Within the village setting, the two main sources of funds for building are from the 
government and remittances from abroad. Simply put by one of the technical engineers 
on the NSET team at the Singati LRTC, “the government is not giving sufficient support 
or timely support,” and one house owner stated “the government money is nowhere.” 
While the government has promised three lakh (300,000 rupees or about $3,000) to 
rebuild each collapsed house, politics have plagued the National Reconstruction 
Authority and most families have only received the initial installment of 50,000 rupees 
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($500), if they’ve received anything at all (Shrestha 2016). It is also important to 
recognize that education and literacy have been linked to the ability to access funds from 
NGOs and the government, increasing existing divides within the community. As I 
walked around the village visiting construction sites, many folks would come up to me 
and launch into an impassioned speech about the lack of money, hoping that I could 
report back government officials. However, even the full promised amount would be 
inadequate to cover actual construction. The first 50,000-rupee installment, intended to 
build the foundation, would cover only half of its estimated cost and the average one-
story house was typically quoted at 10-15 lakh. Thus the main source of funding for 
building in Baruwa is remittances, either through direct returns from family members 
(often children) or through an informal loan system where others are able to borrow from 
these families with migrants. (Baruwa Secondary School – Interview; Ward Chairperson 
– Interview). 
         This pattern of (largely male) migration and remittances also has broader 
implications for the implementation of a program like Baliyo Ghar. A few questions that 
need to be addressed include the following: How does migration affect the time that 
individuals remaining behind have to attend meetings if they also have to carry out more 
work at home? Who goes abroad and who stays behind? Who then is most involved with 
a program like Baliyo Ghar? One of the largest immediate affects of migration is on the 
labor force remaining in the community; many interviewees at construction sites 
mentioned the lack of young men to physically build the house as a main challenge. This 
is consistent with previous academic research that points to lack of money and time as 
two of the greatest constraints on action in response to risks to earthquakes and other 
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natural disasters (Douglas 1975:236). Individuals at NSET are also aware of this 
challenge – the NSET team at the Singati LRTC pointed to the lack of trained masons in 
the community, even after the initial trainings, to be one the challenges of their work and 
Bijay Upadhyay discussed how this constraint was one of the main reasons NSET 
expected rebuilding to take at least five years. 
         Additionally, especially in a remote community like my research site, there are 
often significant limitations on material resources. At the basic level, there are obvious 
constraints on the natural resources, like rocks and wood bands, found around the village 
and needed for construction. Rock blocks or chunks also need to be cut and shaped, a 
significant time and/or financial investment; as one house owner put it, “in Kathmandu 
they have brick houses, all they need to do is stack them. Here we have rock houses, 
which is much harder.” Though the statement of the ease of building houses in 
Kathmandu is perhaps not totally true, the sentiment expressed still points to the effort 
required to procure materials. All houses also need, at the very least, jasta (metal roofing) 
transported from the nearest major town (in this case Singati), and houses with RCC 
bands (considered to be stronger) also need to bring back iron rods, gravel, and cement. 
Materials themselves are often expensive and require house owners to coordinate 
transportation. These challenges are exacerbated by the damage following the earthquake 
– the ward chairperson described how “after the earthquake there was a lot of hardship,” 
especially for rebuilding, because of the damage to the road, the challenges of 
transporting building materials, and the limited water for setting the concrete. 
While NSET does not provide direct financial assistance, Baliyo Ghar is designed 
to mitigate the above constraints. Though the program does not include funds for building 
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houses, mobile teams do provide a small stipend and tools to the masons who complete 
the trainings, which can also help to offset any lost income from the time commitment. 
Additionally, the foundation of the program is built on the idea of both training existing 
masons and creating an expanded workforce to be able to rebuild sooner, helping to 
address the limitations on human resources. Furthermore, NSET’s inclusion of a safe 
building design that utilizes cheaper local materials does make Baliyo Ghar more 
accessible to everyone building houses in Baruwa, regardless of whether they have the 
funds to bring more expensive materials from Singati. 
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability of community-based disaster risk management depends on 
community interest, community involvement and leadership, and implementation in 
connection to the broader field of disaster risk management. 
Community interest in maintaining the program or continuing work on earthquake 
preparation is crucial for an effective program. Often considered as part of the exit 
strategy near the completion date, sustainability of programs needs to be incorporated 
throughout the development and implementation process. One effective way to ensure the 
long-term success is to create a sense of ownership by the community; to do so, you 
“must respect people’s priorities” (Van Aalst 2008:168). In Baruwa, most people 
currently view a strong house as the most important aspect of earthquake preparation 
since nearly all of the houses collapsed in the last earthquake and falling houses were 
responsible for the four deaths. Additionally, beyond ideas about risk reduction, people 
are going to be most focused on rebuilding, as housing is one of the most basic needs, 
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before having time or energy for what might be viewed as unnecessary programs. 
Overall, Baliyo Ghar fulfills this component, including awareness and other preparation 
initiatives under the larger umbrella of rebuilding, rather than implementing them 
independently and immediately. 
Programs must also be multi-faceted and address disaster risk management more 
broadly, rather than just earthquake risk management. The necessity of this distinction 
can be seen clearly in Baruwa where, beyond collapsed houses, much of the destruction 
caused in 2015 was a result of the large landslides that followed the shaking. When 
talking about the effects of the earthquake in one interview, the man said “from the 
earthquake came many problems. Landslides came, the road broke.” Therefore, when 
asked what would be the most important thing to do before another earthquake happens, 
the teachers at the secondary school mentioned their current hillside planting initiative, 
which seeks to stabilize the exposed earth and prevent future landslides. This initiative is 
through a student club called “Green Force,” which is working in conjunction with the 
conservation office and a Singati nursery to plant different kinds of trees, including sala 
(pine) and udis (alder). There was also mention of building baadh, the wire boxes filled 
with rocks that are used to stabilize roadsides. While the government is not helping with 
these initiatives and they do not fall under the Baliyo Ghar program description, other 
NGOs have reportedly expressed an interest in providing funds to support them. By 
working with the community to identify their most pressing concerns and desires for 
future projects, NGOs, INGOs, and the government will be able to develop programs and 
projects that have the most community support, both during and after implementation. 
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Additionally, Baliyo Ghar represents a sustainable model through its training 
program. The ultimate goal of the program is that once masons are trained in one VDC 
(either through the earthquake resistant construction program or the all-inclusive program 
for new masons), they will be able to share what they learned with others. In this way, 
even after NSET is gone, the knowledge will be maintained. The main foundation of the 
program is based in utilizing existing models of on-the-job training for new masons, 
which will in turn allow trained masons to successfully provide similar teaching to new 
masons studying under them. Furthermore, following the trainings, the role of the 
technical engineer in the community is to provide support rather than lead the projects, 
which allows both house owners and masons to feel a sense of ownership over the 
construction projects and builds confidence in their skills going forward.  
Lastly, the NSET teams recognized that, with limited resources, it is not possible 
to work in every town; however, they hoped to establish a trend in the region where 
neighboring communities will be able to see the value and progress of communities like 
Baruwa and reach out to implement it in their own village. The sharing of knowledge can 
already be seen – on one construction site, the lead mason was a man from Baruwa who 
had been trained by an NSET Baliyo Ghar program in a nearby town, and was teaching 
those under him how to build in an earthquake resistant manner. While the true 
sustainability of the program will only be established after its completion in 2020, the 
strategies implemented thus far suggest that NSET is both thinking about this component 
and coming up with effective strategies. 
When expanded to work with CDMCs, sustainability can be connected to and 
measured by actions taken to increase their own capacity independent of work with 
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NSET, and active leadership from the CDMCs with other individuals in the communities 
or other interested wards. For example, Chhetrapati CDMC hired consultants to help the 
committee develop the initial comprehensive disaster management plan for their ward, 
and the Chhetrapati Free Clinic is currently undergoing a retrofitting process supported 
and led by Bijay Mali. Panga CDMC also utilized its limited funds to conduct fire-
fighting trainings. These trainings were not supported by the American Red Cross within 
its project description but, as one committee member described, “we felt that [it] was 
needed and we did it by ourselves.” In some cases, like those of Ward 34 and 17, CDMCs 
have been active in helping develop disaster management plans or coordinating other 
community level trainings for other wards, building on their own experiences and 
expertise (Bijay Mali – Interview; Pradhanang 2002:137). 
Lastly, for effective disaster risk management, implementation must be connected 
with other levels of DRM process, especially with local, regional, and national 
governments. Bijay Mali, President of the Chhetrapati CDMC, has stated that it’s crucial 
that the government coordinate with the communities to develop preparedness plans, 
allowing for increased awareness and intentional response post-disaster. This relationship 
between the government and community groups must happen at all stages of the process. 
Providing another example, individuals with the Panga CDMC expressed their frustration 
with the lack of communication between the group and the government. While the 
government was slow in its response to analyzing which buildings were safe to live in, 
which needed to be demolished, and which houses needed funds to rebuild, their CDMC 
had already completed extensive mapping projects; however, there was to pathway to 
effectively share this knowledge with the government. 
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The newly elected community level government could provide a good interface 
between CDMCs and the Nepali government. Unlike the previous governmental 
institutions responsible at the Village Development Community level, these new local 
councils will also have the ability to govern, not just administer, providing them with 
increased discretion to engage with disaster risk management. However, these CDMCs 
should also maintain their operating independence, thus giving them more freedom to 
develop their own programs and to avoid the politics inherent in government. However, it 
is critical for CDMCs to retain some political independence so as to avoid being caught 
up in the “too familiar political context for resource appropriation” that emerged with 
many disaster relief policies following the 2015 earthquakes (Raj and Gautam 2015:7). 
Independent of individual frustration, Bijay Upadhyay raised concerns about certain 
CDMCs, Chhetrapati included, being uninterested in this mainstreaming of the 
community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) process; however, he emphasized 
that this was key for maintaining CDMC support beyond the timeframe of the current 
engaged leaders. 
  
Conclusion 
 NSET works very closely with communities across Nepal through community 
disaster management committees (CDMCs) and its Baliyo Ghar programming, and has 
developed programming that successfully addresses the four fundamental categories 
identified by Raj and Gautam for DRM in Nepal – social acceptability, legality, 
economical viability, and equitability. Through its social mobilizer model, NSET 
emphasizes cultural understanding and working at community-level understandings of 
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risk. This includes teaching about Nepali sayings that promote calm earthquake response 
and traditional construction techniques. While NSET’s programming still prioritizes 
scientific risk perception, research, and engineering, and focuses on ultimately educating 
the community into this way of understanding, it is generally culturally aware and 
therefore socially acceptable. These programs are also well-integrated into governmental 
frameworks, be it working with community groups and local government to develop 
response plans or establishing Baliyo Ghar as an official Build Back Better program 
under the National Reconstruction Authority. While its funding sources vary for their 
work with CDMCs and Baliyo Ghar, NSET is realistic about recognizing its economic 
limitations and emphasizes sustainability from program design to closure of a program, 
creating DRM projects that are economically effective with the resources it has access to. 
Finally, with regards to equity within its programming, I argue that NSET has an 
institutionalized understanding of equity but does not fully implications of diversity 
among caste, gender, class, and more at the community-level, as well as the broader 
influences of migration, connection to international community, and limitations on 
material resources. 
Further research should be conducted on the impact of community diversity and 
urban or rural nature of the communities themselves in disaster preparedness, response, 
and recovery. Previous social scientists have noted that homogenous communities tend to 
have stronger social ties, which are reinforced and utilized in disaster response. This was 
reinforced in my research, where the communities I worked with were largely 
homogenous communities consisting of castes that are traditionally wealthier and/or more 
connected to international communities – Baruwa had a Sherpa majority and Panga and 
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Chhetrapati were both predominantly Newari. Similar differences may be observed 
between urban and rural communities, and were expected by NSET. Bijay Upadhyay 
noted that “in the rural [communities], what happens is everyone is nearer, the bonding 
more strong, the information passes on very quickly,” which may lead to stronger bonds 
in disaster response as well. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
I have been working here for the last twenty years… I am hopeful. Because if these last 
20 or 25 years were negative, I would have shifted to another profession. It is true that 
you can’t make changes instantly. It takes time. Just go out and, say, examine five years 
back and examine now, you have a lot of positive changes; you have a lot of learnings. 
But simply saying that is not enough, we have to make the whole country shift. That 
doesn’t mean that I should quit though. We were the only institution talking about 
earthquake for how many years? From at least 1998 to 2005. People started listening to 
us only when we had the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, the [Indian Ocean] earthquake and 
tsunami in 2004, and then, 2005, the Kashmir earthquake. And then people started 
saying, “these people were talking about earthquakes and now they have been employed. 
They have been working for Indonesia; they have been working for Pakistan; they have 
been working for India.” And that got people interested, and now you have people talking 
about earthquakes now. There are people who really laughed at us when Amod and 
myself and some of the people went to the government people and the municipalities and 
started talking about training the masons – and now these people who laughed at us say 
“do the mason training.” – Bijay Upadhyay 
NSET’s founding charter in 1993 stated that its guiding goal was to work towards 
an “earthquake safe Nepal by 2020.” Twenty-five years later, and less than two years 
from this target, where are NSET and Nepal at? Anyone approaching the topic would be 
quick to agree that country-wide, there is quite a way to go towards this goal and that 
another major quake would certainly be a disaster. Perhaps this initial goal was ambitious 
and unachievable even starting in 1993; certainly, the 2015 earthquakes delayed or halted 
implementation of programs and forced attention towards recovery measures. Still, the 
focus on “Build Back Better” – thus incorporating preparedness and DRM goals into the 
reconstruction process – and the (at least temporary) increased interest in DRM could be 
seen as positive outcomes towards a higher goal. Despite all that still must happen in the 
future, Bijay Upadhyay remains hopeful about the future of DRM in Nepal, taking a step 
back to recognize all that NSET has accomplished over the last 25 years and the shifting 
national conversation around DRM. 
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In this thesis, I situated NSET within this broader conversation of disaster risk 
management, emphasizing its relationships with government, NGOs, international aid 
agencies, and community actors. Since 1993, NSET has whole-heartedly taken on the 
role of leader within the field of DRM in Nepal, working, as it strives to, for the people of 
Nepal. I argue, overall, that NSET successfully navigates unique relationships with these 
different actors, including differentiating between different risk conceptions and 
languages, to advance its broadly defined agenda. These relationships with other 
components of DRM have shaped NSET’s programming, allowing NSET to maximize its 
effectiveness. Working with the Government of Nepal, NSET has emphasized building 
code implementation, an aspect of DRM that falls under its purview; with NGOs and 
international development agencies, NSET relies on its scientific base to successfully 
navigate access to funding and provide reports about progress; at the community level, 
the position of the social mobilizer reflects NSET’s interest in addressing cultural 
perceptions of risk, incorporating cultural and community knowledge, and increase 
disaster preparedness through community disaster management committees and 
reconstruction projects.   
NSET’s successful approach to DRM can serve as a model for the DRM 
community and others in Nepal, as well as providing further opportunities for 
advancement of earthquake safety across communities. Based in these strong 
relationships that it, as an institution, has built with different sectors, especially 
communities and the Government of Nepal, NSET has the ability to create bridging 
relationships across different sectors; for example, NSET can play a valuable role in 
facilitating community disaster preparedness plans with local governments that build on 
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human resources within the community, financial resources from international 
organizations, and fit within the DRM network in Nepal. NSET’s programming already 
reflects an understanding of the complexity of DRM and the necessity to approach a 
single issue from many sides; its approach to engineering and safe building construction 
provides an excellent example, through its collaboration with the government on building 
code implementation and Build Back Better to create an institutional framework and legal 
encouragement, implementing training programs for masons to meet the demand for 
human resources, designing earthquake-resistant housing models that take into 
consideration questions of access to materials and cost, and raising awareness at the 
individual and community level about the need to build earthquake-safe houses. Through 
this approach, NSET has the potential to strengthen collaboration with subsections of 
DRM as well, especially the network of NGOs working in Nepal. 
This thesis also sought to move beyond simple narratives of effectiveness as 
defined and conveyed in official reports by NSET and USAID, instead addressing the 
complexities of risk perception and communication, nuanced relationships among actors, 
and possibilities for further collaboration. My research suggested that, in navigating 
different conceptions of and conversations on risk, especially the perceived divide 
between scientific and subjective risk perceptions, NSET may face limitations in reaching 
its ultimate goal of an earthquake safe Nepal. Because NSET takes the level of risk of 
and in a future earthquake to be clear within its scientific framework, its work at the 
community level has focused on developing an understanding of this scientific 
understanding of risk; however, this framework may not adequately take into account the 
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numerous other considerations at an individual and cultural level that influence the 
relative consideration and importance given to a wide variety of risks. 
Continued research on NSET’s work, as well as the broader field of disaster risk 
management in Nepal, must interrogate further questions surrounding inclusiveness and 
equitability, both in preparedness and response. Additionally, as more research is 
published regarding findings after the 2015 earthquakes, this must be incorporated into 
discussions of preparedness and disaster risk management, to shape and inform continued 
work by domestic and international players. 
Disaster risk management must continue to be a central pillar of organization and 
development in Nepal; NSET may remain a leader in the field but individuals and 
organizations across sectors must also take up the mantle. Furthermore, NSET and the 
Government of Nepal must both work to develop education and preparedness programs 
for Western Nepal; high seismicity, unstable soils, and low preparation near Pokhara and 
the surrounding area will lead to extremely high rates of casualties when a major 
earthquake hits. NSET’s biggest constraints for work in that region have historically been 
a lack of funding and support for programming; this lack of focus has been compounded 
by the recent focus on rebuilding and reconstruction in eastern Nepal. Ultimately, the 
unfortunate truth is that we will not truly know how DRM and preparation will play out, 
or whether they can be defined as successful with regards to saving lives, decreasing 
resulting damage, and minimizing societal disruption in eastern or western Nepal, until 
the next big earthquake hits the country. 
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Key Terms, Organizations, & Translations: 
All Nepali terms, except for proper program names like “Baliyo Ghar” will be italicized. 
Translations of relevant interviews with be utilized in this paper, with the original 
language included in parenthesis. I will utilize the Romanization of Nepali language that I 
learned in my language courses through the Pitzer in Nepal program, except in cases 
when alternative spellings are used by organizations that I am citing. 
 
3PERM – Promoting Public Private Partnership for Earthquake Risk Management, an 
NSET program 
ADPC – Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, an NGO based in Bangkok, Thailand 
working on disaster risk management 
banaaunu – to build 
Baliyo Ghar – literally “strong house,” the name of NSET’s main community project, 
implemented 2015-2020 in conjunction with funding from USAID. 
BCIPN – Building Code Implementation Program in Nepal, a program implemented by 
NSET with support from USAID, planned from Oct 2012-Sept 2015. 
bhuichaalo, bhukampa – two Nepali terms for earthquake, utilized interchangeably in 
interviews 
Build Back Better – the overarching goal and tagline for reconstruction projects 
supported and completed by the National Reconstruction Authority and a variety of 
NGOs and INGOs. 
CBDRM – Community-based disaster risk management, a model for DRM work 
CDMC – Community disaster management committee 
Also commonly used to refer to Chhetrapati Disaster Management Committee, a long-
standing community group working to increased community preparation for earthquakes 
and a key actor in response following the 2015 earthquakes. They also helped distribute 
roofing materials to Baruwa. 
CFC – Chhetrapati Free Clinic – a free community hospital in Chhetrapati and the main 
location for the Ward 17 Disaster Management Committee 
chiura – beaten rice, can be cooked (fried) or eaten raw 
CELC – Community Earthquake Learning Center, NSET’s main building in Kathmandu, 
built in 2009. 
darkaarmi – mason, the key focus population for the Baliyo Ghar training programs 
DMC – Disaster Management Committee 
DPNet-Nepal – Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal, a Nepali NGO, founded 1996. 
DR4 – Disaster Risk Reduction, Reconstruction & Resilience Office, an office under 
USAID. 
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DRM – Disaster risk management, a cyclical process that includes mitigation of risk, 
search and rescue activities, and reconstruction 
DRR – Disaster risk reduction, one component of the disaster risk management cycle 
ESD – Earthquake Safety Day, celebrated in Nepal every year, on January 15th or 16th, 
since 1999 
Go-bag – jatpat jholaa, an easy-to-grab bag filled with food, water, and medical supplies 
kept accessible for evacuation with during an earthquake 
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency, a Japanese development organization 
khaana – food 
Mobile Team – Baliyo Ghar’s outreach teams working in more remote VDCs in the four 
districts. Each team includes a technical engineer, a social mobilizer, and a lead engineer. 
MoHA – Ministry of Home Affairs, the focal point for DRM within the Government of 
Nepal 
NCDM – Nepal Centre for Disaster Management 
NGOs, INGOs – Non-governmental organizations, International non-governmental 
organizations. A variety work in Disaster Risk Management in Nepal, including the 
National Society for Earthquake Technology and Nepali Red Cross. International NGOs 
work in multiple countries.  
NGS – Nepal Geological Society 
NRA – National Reconstruction Authority (puna nirmaan = reconstruction) 
NRCS – Nepal Red Cross Society 
NSET – National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal 
OFDA – Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, an office under USAID 
PEER – Program for Enhanced Emergency Response, a regional program designed and 
implemented by ADPC, USAID, and NSET focused on training professionals. 
RTCs/LRTCs –Reconstruction Technology Centers, Local Reconstruction Technology 
Centers. The implementing location for Baliyo Ghar – in charge of education, mason 
trainings, and oversight of Mobile Teams. 
SESP – School Earthquake Safety Programme, an NSET program started in 1999 
surakshit – safe (e.g. surakshit ghar or strong house) 
taalim – training 
tayaari – preparedness (e.g. bhuichaaloko tayaari or earthquake preparedness) 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development, the core funder of the 
Baliyo Ghar program. 
VDC – Village Development Committee, the title for the 3,157 lower administrative 
localities in Nepal. While VDCs were replaced by Gaunpalikas (rural municipalities) in 
March 2017, this paper utilizes the unit of VDC as referred to by NSET. 
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Appendix A: Selected photos from Baruwa 
 
a. This house was one of about six that did not collapse in the last earthquake. Note the 
lack of bands along the outside walls, rock walls on all floors, and stone slab roof. 
 
 
b. Close-up of traditional stone slab roofing material, which is brought in from a 
neighboring town. To reduce the weight, especially in case of collapse, tin roofing is 
recommended. 
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c. Model created by NSET’s program during one of the initial trainings demonstrating 
baliyo ghar building methods using wood to create bands and ties. Note also the level 
foundation created at the bottom. 
 
 
d. Model created by NSET’s program during one of the initial trainings demonstrating 
baliyo ghar building methods using RCC and iron rods to create bands and ties. Note also 
the level foundation created at the bottom. 
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e. Early phase of a new house construction. Note the similarity with the NSET models, 
including the foundation, first horizontal band and wood framing. Also see the exposed 
rebar sticking out of the top for an example of vertical bands. 
 
  
f.  Two houses under construction. In the foreground, note the horizontal RCC bands 
between layers of rock and the strong framing for windows and doors. 
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g. A good example of horizontal wood bands between layers. Note also the wood ties that 
connect the outside band with the inside band. This increases stability and helps to 
prevent slippage and collapse in earthquakes. 
  
 
h. A completed two-story house built following many of the recommended techniques. 
Note the horizontal and vertical bands on the first floor, the use of metal siding and wood 
instead of rocks on the second floor, and the metal roofing. 
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